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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report presents the replication of an MTI study conducted in 2001 by Peter Haas 
and Richard Werbel.1 That research, itself a continuation of an earlier project completed 
in 2000,2 included an analysis of transportation tax elections in 11 urban areas across the 
nation and culminated in the identification of 17 community-level factors with potential 
impact on the success of ballot measures for sales tax increases to fund transportation 
packages with substantial rail components. Many of the 17 factors identified in the research 
were moderately to strongly associated with electoral success and failure of transit tax 
initiatives. Among the key findings from the original (2001) report were:
• Passing transit initiatives in communities featuring transit agencies of questionable 
reputations, in those fielding credible opposition, or those lacking a traffic congestion 
“crisis” is extremely difficult;
• Achieving consensus support from business community leaders, elected officials, 
and environmental groups is potentially problematic, but may be crucial in fundraising 
for and promotion of the final transit package;
• Support for transportation-related tax increases from business community and key 
elected officials is apparently linked to their close involvement in development of the 
package; and
• Attracting campaign funds in excess of $1 million seems essential to effectively 
promoting transit initiatives.
Closely following the approach of the 2001 study, this updated research employs in-depth 
analysis of transportation tax elections in eight communities, representing a variety of urban 
settings across the United States. Unlike the 2001 study which was somewhat exploratory 
in nature, this report presents a more direct analysis of each of the 17 factors, denoting 
whether a condition is present, absent or inconclusively present in each case. Whereas the 
total number of cases is insignificant for purposes of statistical inference, these findings do 
represent the population of this type of election in the past decade and may be applicable 
to communities of similar land use patterns, socioeconomic dispersal, political climate 
and other like environmental factors. Most important, this replication enables a careful 
reconsideration of the applicability of conclusions of a decade ago to the present day.
The eight cases studies included in this report represent a variety of circumstances, 
ranging from approval of a starter rail line, to supplementing an existing tax, to affirming 
public desire that a general excise tax fund a light rail system, to voting against repeal of 
an existing sales tax.
Maricopa, AZ (November 2, 2004): Success
At the height of a population boom and associated increased congestion, under conditions 
that conformed almost perfectly to successful transit outcomes identified in the 2001 study, 
Maricopa County approved with 57 percent voter support to renewal of a ½ cent sales 
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tax to fund an extension of light rail, new bus services and new highway construction, 
representing up to $14.3 billion in revenue generated over a 20-year period. Campaigners 
were able to successfully blend multimedia tactics in soliciting support for the proposal, 
raising $4 million in contrast to (possibly record) unusually large amount of opposition 
funding (in excess of $2 million).
Seattle (November 6, 2007): Failure
The 2006 Washington State Legislature required the King, Pierce and Snohomish Counties’ 
Regional Transit Investment District (RTID) to work in partnership with Sound Transit (RTA) 
beginning in June 2006 to jointly submit a comprehensive transportation and highway plan 
to voters in the November 2007 election. Sound Transit primarily developed plans for 50 
miles of new light rail services and park-and-ride facilities. RTID focused on 186 miles of 
highway expansions, including HOV lanes and improvements to the pivotal 520 floating 
bridge connecting Seattle and Medina. The resulting package, nicknamed “Roads and 
Transit,” amassed a base cost of $18 billion in 2006 dollars, nearly $10.8 billion of this for 
Sound Transit’s Link Light Rail. The projects would be funded by a combined 6/10 of a cent 
sales tax increase and each automobile owner within the Sound Transit District would 
pay an increased vehicle excise tax of $80 for every $10,000 of his or her car’s value 
for a projected period of 20 years. The remaining financing relied on state and federal 
government grants, and did not account for $1.5 billion of the projected cost. Questionable 
past transit financing decisions and key voices of well-funded, well-organized opposition 
(including the environmental community) seemed to contribute to the measure’s 45 percent 
to 55 percent defeat.
Charlotte, Mecklenburg County (November 6, 2007): Success
This measure was a repeal vote of a voter-passed 1998 initiative. MTI’s 2001 study 
detailed Charlotte’s 1998 vote in favor of a ½ cent sales tax increase to fund the “2025 
Transit/Land Use Plan.” Underperformance of tax revenues, construction delays and cost-
overruns associated with Charlotte’s first light rail line (LYNX Blue or South Corridor Line) 
led an individual critic of light rail with the financial means to fund a petition drive repealing 
the ½  cent increase, which would have effectively ended Charlotte’s indefinite plans for 
expanded light rail, bus rapid transit, commuter rail and street car services. The signatures 
were accepted and the repeal measure approved for the November ballot in spring of 
2007. In response, the Charlotte City Council and Chamber of Commerce launched an 
aggressive campaign protecting the light rail system, which was set to commence operation 
Thanksgiving weekend, November 2007, regardless the result of the vote. Citizens of 
Charlotte voted against the repeal (and for light rail) 70 percent to 30 percent.
City and County of Honolulu (November 4, 2008): Success
This measure was an affirmation vote of a previously enacted excise tax. In August 2005, 
the council of the City and County of Honolulu exercised its authority to increase the 
General Excise Tax (GET) on Oahu by .5 percent for the dedicated purpose of funding a 
new transit system. Prolonged dispute as to what form the system should take, coupled 
with “steel wheel” champion Mayor Mufi Hannemann’s failure to win reelection outright 
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(in a runoff system), prompted the mayor and council to place a Charter Amendment on 
the November ballot affirming public support for an elevated 20-mile light rail system to 
be funded by the tax increase. On November 4, 2008, citizens of Honolulu agreed to the 
16-year (sunset-limited) GET increase being devoted to a “steel wheel” system with 53 
percent of the vote. Honolulu demonstrates how multi-level governmental cooperation in 
cultivation may help lead to public support for a new light rail system.
Los Angeles County (November 4, 2008): Success
Measure R funds a comprehensive, 30-year plan for congestion relief in Los Angeles County. 
A marquee project to be funded by the ½ cent sales tax increase and championed by Los 
Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, is a “Subway to the Sea” connecting downtown Los 
Angeles and coastal Santa Monica. Projected to raise $40 billion over its 30-year lifespan, 
Measure R will also fund extensions of light rail service to East Los Angeles, and new light 
rail lines to West and South L.A. In drafting this enormous proposal, Los Angeles Metro 
officials appealed to bus riding and automobile constituencies by dedicating 20 percent of 
revenues to highway construction and 20 percent to bus operations and maintenance. The 
series of 14 proposed projects garnered support in West Los Angeles particularly, and was 
able to secure 67.93 percent in favor, exceeding California’s two-thirds threshold.
Kansas City, MO (November 4, 2008): Failure
After approving an infeasible citizen-led initiative in 2006, the people of Kansas City voted 
to defeat a proposed ⅜ cent sales tax increase to fund a 14-mile starter light rail line. 
The tax would have generated approximately $815 million over a 25-year period, with 
remaining financing relying on federal matching grants. While the brand-new line would 
have connected downtown activity centers and the proposal detailed origin and terminus 
points, the route was yet to be specified. Kansas City Mayor Mark Funkhouser lent the 
measure his avid support only after conceding that no consensus could be achieved for a 
more broadly-based (and expensive) transportation plan. Lukewarm support came from 
the business community, leading to a poorly funded pro-rail campaign that relied largely 
on novel ploys (such as use of social media websites and direct contact via text message). 
This lack of spirited coalition of pro-rail advocates allowed substantially funded opposition 
forces to fill the news vacuum with messages of lingering uncertainty as to the wisdom of 
the plan.
St. Louis County (November 4, 2008): Failure
Facing a $45 million deficit, St. Louis County proposed Measure M, a ½ cent countywide 
sales tax increase, to meet this operations shortfall and fund future (unspecified) extensions 
of Metrolink light rail services by generating $80 million annually over a 20-year period. 
Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama drew tremendous crowds to polling 
places across the country, particularly among young people and minorities. In St. Louis 
County, the Measure M campaign assumed support of the African American community 
for a measure protecting bus services, and did not target this decidedly pro-Obama group. 
Many predominantly African American precincts of St. Louis County featured wait times 
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of two to four hours, and Measure M, which appeared at the end of a long ballot featuring 
“competing” sales tax initiatives was defeated 48.5 percent to 51.5 percent.
Santa Clara County (November 4, 2008): Success
MTI’s 2001 study featured Santa Clara County’s improbable passage of Measure A in 
2000, a 30-year extension of a ½ cent transit-dedicated sales tax increase set to expire 
in 2006. The 2000 vote featured $6 billion in projects, including the highly anticipated Bay 
Area Rapid Transit (BART) heavy rail extension to San Jose. Measure A “included more 
than $1 billion in rail operating costs, but according to VTA staff, another sales tax to 
cover operating costs for the life of the tax would probably be needed in 2012 or 2014.”3 
In 2008, the VTA board proposed a ⅛ cent supplemental sales tax increase to generate 
a dedicated revenue stream sufficient to fulfill the bulk of VTA’s obligation to BART for the 
operation, maintenance and future capital reserve of the system. On November 4, 2008, 
the tax increase was very narrowly approved with 66.78 percent of the vote, California 
requiring a two-thirds majority.
General Trends
General trends observed in these case studies were highly consistent with the following 
findings from the 2001 study:
• The importance of consensus amongst the business, elected and environmental 
communities, and accompanying depth of financial support
• The difficulty of passing an initiative without well-funded, effective use of multimedia
• The importance of utilizing experienced campaign consultants
Again, while limited inference can be drawn from this set of case studies, factors or 
conditions that seemed to decrease in prominence included:
• The effectiveness of presenting a multimodal package
• The perception of benefits of a package being distributed throughout the voting 
district
• The experience gained in recent transit elections
• The credibility of the transit agency
Further, this compilation includes an exploration of “rebound” elections – those instances 
in which a failed measure is quickly followed by a successful one – and the factors that 
seem linked to achieving success in such instances. Four of the eight cases studied were 
part of a pair of ballot measures offered in rapid succession. While this is again reflective 
of a small study sample, additional factors that may be of possible importance in this more 
differentiated context include:
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• Assured financing may enhance voter confidence in the deliverability of proposals;
• Specified routes may increase perceptions of individual benefits;
• The bleak reality of tangible service cuts may trump other factors; and
• The effectiveness of a region’s predominant newspaper in portraying an initiative in 
a positive or negative light
These findings suggest that a number of variables not included in the primary analysis 
may be particularly relevant to the success or failure of transit measures and should not 
be discredited by transportation planners and campaign entities.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
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I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODS
Local sales, property, and other types of tax increases tied to transit and other transportation 
expenditures have become the most prominent source of new funding for local transportation 
projects. With ever greater demand for transportation and transit-related capacity, even as 
state and federal support for such projects has continued to flatten or decrease, localities 
are increasingly looking to raise their own funding by means of local, voter-approved tax 
increases. Although voter-approved property tax increases are also on the rise, most 
large-scale projects are based on sales tax increases.4
Since 2000, a total 367 ballot measures have been considered nationally. Such measures 
are increasingly meeting with success. In 2000 and 2001, for example, only about half of 
all measures were approved by voters, whereas more than three-fourths of all measures 
since 2008 have been approved. In the 11-year period 2000-2010, an average of 71 
percent of all transportation measures succeeded, a rate that is twice as high as that for 
all other types of local tax initiatives. Even in California, where a two-thirds supermajority 
of votes are required to pass dedicated local tax increases, most proposals are accepted 
by voters.5
But not all transportation measures succeed, obviously. Sale tax increases, which are 
typically associated with larger, capital-intensive projects, are less likely to succeed than 
property taxes measures. In 2010 for example, 81 percent of all property tax increase 
measures were approved, compared to just 59 percent of sales tax increases.6 Unsuccessful 
proposals to increase sales taxes result in a waste of time, effort, and fund-raising. MTI 
has therefore conducted several studies to help determine how and why transportation tax 
measures succeed or fail.
In 2000 and again in 2001, MTI conducted and published analyses of elections involving 
transit taxes initiatives for projects that included a “substantial” rail component. The 
focus on ballot measures that include rail projects was present because: (a) many larger 
communities seek to create or enhance rail transit, and (b) such projects tend to be 
expensive and hence, more controversial and difficult to pass.7 The 2000 report included 
a quantitative (logistic regression) analysis of the outcomes of 57 transit tax elections, 
not exclusively rail-related, that occurred between 1990 and 1998. However, despite the 
inclusion of many potentially important variables, the model used in that report explained 
only about 15 percent of the variation in the outcome of transit elections. The report also 
included four in-depth case studies that examined the impact of more qualitative factors in 
affecting the outcome of transit tax elections, and particularly emphasized the means by 
which coalitions of stakeholders were created and used to wage effective campaigns in 
support of transit taxes.
The 2001 MTI study expanded greatly upon and also refined the case study methodology 
used in 2000. Based on case studies culled from ballot measures in eleven communities 
across the U.S., the report focused on systemically identifying the effect, if any, of up to 17 
community-level factors on the electoral outcome of these measures. Although the case 
study approach does not yield results that can be scientifically validated with measurable 
accuracy, it does enable much closer consideration of community-level variables, or factors, 
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that are intuitively efficacious in creating a winning or losing campaign. Moreover, the case 
study approach enables examination of the more actionable aspects of the campaign, 
such that practitioners can apply the results to actual campaign planning. In fact, since 
publication of the 2001 report, its authors have received many requests from officials of 
local agencies and other interested parties for presentations of the results of the study, 
presumably to see how they applied to their own community’s efforts.
However, ten years have passed since the publication of the 2001 MTI study. Are the same 
factors that seemed most important to the outcome of transportation tax elections still as 
significant? Have other trends and developments created significant changes in how these 
factors do or do not affect election outcomes? The current study seeks to address this line 
of questioning, and is therefore intended to serve as a replication of the 2001 MTI study. 
The current study is not intended to break new ground concerning the possible effect of 
factors that may have been excluded from the 2001 study, with the exception of a few 
observations that may merit consideration for future research.
METHODS USED IN THIS REPORT
The 2001 MTI study had a significantly exploratory purpose and therefore delved into 
seeking to describe and explain the character of campaigns, including marketing 
techniques and message components. However, findings from those aspects of the 2001 
report were difficult to generalize upon; instead, the most useful findings were culled from 
a more straightforward analysis of potentially important factors (or variables) that may 
have affected the outcome of eleven transit tax elections. By contrast, the current study 
is intended only to directly replicate those key findings from the 2001 report. The differing 
character of the present study, along with changes in information technology, has direct 
implications for the methods used.
Both the 2001 and present MTI studies were based on a case study approach. However, 
as the 2001 effort was of greater scope, it included on-site interviews with key stakeholders 
and actors in eleven communities of interest. This on-site interviewing enabled in-depth 
interviews with a wide variety of contacts concerning a wide variety of topics. Typically, at 
least one person was interviewed from a variety of groups of officials and stakeholders, 
including political figures, representatives of the local transit agency, the transit tax 
campaign and its opponents, the business community, an environmental organization, 
campaign consultants, local journalists, and others.
For the present study, a more circumscribed approach with respect to interviews was 
adopted. Again, this is appropriate because the scope of the present study is much 
narrower than that of the 2001, which had a far more exploratory scope and purpose. By 
contrast, the purpose of the present study is simply to attempt to replicate key findings from 
the earlier effort. Therefore, for the present study, key interviewees were identified and 
interviewed via telephone, whenever possible. Additionally, the explosion of documentary 
material now accessible via the Internet reduced the need to speak directly with many 
potential interviewees. In 2010, it became relatively easy to verify whether many of the 
factors analyzed in 2001 were present in most of the elections under review. In some 
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cases, phone interviews were used primarily to double-check the validity of facts and 
impressions gleaned from online resources.
In 2001, transit tax elections in 11 communities were analyzed, representing the following 
elections listed in table 1.
Table 1. Summary of Case Study Elections, 2001 MTI Study
Locality State Year Outcome Margin
St. Louis County Missouri 1997 Failed 42% to 58% 
Charlotte North Carolina 1998 Passed 58% to 42%
Columbus Ohio 1999 Failed 45% to 55%
Denver Colorado 1999 Passed 66% to 34%
Alameda County* California 2000 Passed 82% to 18%
Austin Texas 2000 Failed 49.6% to 50.4%
Phoenix Arizona 2000 Passed 65% to 35%
Salt Lake Utah 2000 Passed 54% to 46%
San Antonio Texas 2000 Failed 30% to 70%
Santa Clara County* California 2000 Passed 71% to 29%
Sonoma County* California 2000 Failed 60% to 40%
Note:  
*California elections that required ⅔ majority
Each election involved a significant local sales tax increase to fund a major transportation 
package, each also including at least a partial – yet significant – rail component. 
Additionally, sites were selected that represented both successful (six) and unsuccessful 
(five) campaigns, as well as a geographically and politically diverse group of localities. 
This approach was selected in the belief that as much might be gleaned from a failed 
campaign as a successful one.
The present study is intended, to the extent that is possible and practical, to mirror that 
of 2001 in terms of strategy and design. As in 2001, the current study examines both 
successful and unsuccessful measures, each with rail components, from a nationwide 
perspective. The elections selected and associated information is listed in table 2.
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Table 2. Summary of Case Study Elections, Present Study
Locality State Year Outcome Margin
Maricopa County Arizona 2004 Passed 57% to 43%
Seattle Washington 2007 Failed 45% to 55%
Charlotte* North Carolina 2007 Passed* 70% to 30%
Honolulu Hawaii 2008 Passed 53% to 47%
Los Angeles** California 2008 Passed 68% to 32%
Santa Clara County** California 2008 Passed 67% to 33%
St. Louis County Missouri 2008 Failed 49% to 51%
Kansas City Missouri 2008 Failed 45% to 55%
Note:  
*Referendum on the repeal of a sales tax increase, evaluated from a pro-transit perspective,  
**California elections that required ⅔ majority
Thus the current study includes evaluation of eight elections involving proposed (or, in two 
cases, already passed but challenged by repeal or referendum) sales tax increases, five 
that were successful and three that failed to pass. These elections were also chosen to 
represent the largest (in terms of potential revenue), most important transit tax elections 
between 2004 and 2009. In identifying and selecting important elections, two somewhat 
anomalous campaigns emerged: (1) the Charlotte case involves a referendum on an 
existing tax increase vote passed in 1998, and (2) the Hawaii vote did not in itself raise the 
sales tax, but affirmed that voters wanted to build rail system, and in effect represented 
approval of the tax increase that had already been approved legislatively. While these two 
cases differ somewhat from traditional tax initiatives, they represent a very similar dynamic 
in terms of campaign conditions, strategies, and activities. (Further details about these 
cases follow in the subsections devoted to each.)
The current study also represents three fewer elections (eight rather than eleven) than the 
2001 study. Unfortunately, a sufficient number of elections of similar cast and proportion to 
match the 2001 total were not available for use in the current study. In any event, neither 
study includes enough cases to make statistically significant inferences. The results are 
intended to help identify potentially important factors from a substantively critical, but not 
scientifically statistically significant pool of cases.
As in 2001, the primary means for analyzing the case study data, beyond the primarily 
descriptive narrative that accompanies each subsection, is to identify (a) which factors 
from a list developed in 2001 were either present, absent, or uncertainly or ambiguously 
present, and (b) whether those factors are associated with passage or failure of each 
campaign. Generally, the goal is to identify whether each factor seems to be necessary 
for the passage of transportation tax initiatives, or its absence conversely associated 
with failure. Additionally, of course, the results from the current study are then compared 
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with those of the 2001 effort to determine to what degree and in which ways the factors 
associated with passage and failure differ in the latter study.
FACTORS EVALUATED IN 2001 STUDY
The 2001 MTI study identified 17 factors that might affect the outcome of transit tax 
elections. These factors were gleaned both from existing literature about tax campaigns 
(especially Middleton 1998) and from data collected while creating the case studies for 
that research. In this report, these 17 factors are accepted and seek to determine whether 
they seem to maintain the same associations (or lack thereof) observed in the 2001 study. 
This section presents a brief description of each factor and the original rationale behind its 
selection for the earlier study. The italicized text follows some of the factors to explain any 
modification of what each factors for the current study.
However, every effort was made to recreate the same evaluation scheme that was used 
in the 2001 study. The few changes result primarily from the smaller scope of the current 
study – fewer interviews were conducted on average, stemming from lack of on-site visits. 
Once again, explanation for each factor’s presence or absence is also supported with 
narrative, with marginal outcomes generally receiving an “ambiguous” assignation.
The factors identified in the 2001 study emerged after careful consideration of a mass of 
case study information and are preponderantly and inherently subjective. As noted earlier, 
using strictly quantifiable measures explains only a small percentage of the variation in 
election outcomes. In most instances, determining the presence (or absence) of a particular 
factor involves a combination of information gleaned from telephone interviews, newspaper 
and other documentary sources, and published statistical information. Every effort was 
made to maintain consistency and validity of these measures, but, with several obvious 
exceptions, they are at best considered judgments and not hard measures. Additionally, 
the number of factors was intended to cast a wide net in the original study. In analysis, 
several of these factors were apparently not really very important at all. However, in the 
spirit of replication all are again considered here.
1. Congestion “crisis”
Definition: This factor refers to the perception, real or not, that a community is facing 
traffic congestion of such magnitude that it is a high or very high priority for most citizens. 
Interviews with transportation professionals and other local respondents are weighed. 
When available, survey data may be used to determine the extent to which transportation 
problems are considered to be a “crisis” in a given community. In the current study, 
traffic congestion statistics from the most recent Texas Transportation Institute report on 
congestion rates in American metropolitan areas8 is frequently invoked as a possible proxy 
for this factor.
Rationale: If traffic problems are perceived to be significantly harmful to the economy, 
the environment, and/or the quality of life of a community, voters may be more motivated 
to support tax increases that will fund transportation improvements. Failing such a crisis 
atmosphere, citizens may be less motivated to do so, particularly when the opposition may 
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be able to create uncertainty about the ability of rail transit to take a significant number of 
vehicles off the road.
2. Sponsorship by the business community
Definition: This factor refers to the degree to which the local business community actively 
supports the transportation tax increase. In most instances, this means that local business 
leaders played an active, if not a key role in creating and/or campaigning for the passage 
of a transportation tax initiative. It does not necessarily connote financial support, although 
the two are generally closely linked. This was measured primarily by determining whether a 
consensus of interviewees existed, along with documentary information from newspapers 
and other outlets.
Rationale: Support from business leaders helps measures pass by legitimizing the need 
for a tax increase; voters may look to local business leaders for cues on tax increases. 
Additionally, business leaders can communicate their support to their employees. Without 
such support, or with vocal opposition from business leaders, voters may regard tax 
increase measures as self-serving for local transit agencies or government officials.
3. Sponsorship by key elected officials
Definition: This factor involves one or several key elected officials, usually with area-wide 
responsibilities (such as a mayor or county executive) taking a visible leadership role in 
the promotion of the tax initiative and virtually no officials opposing the measure. This was 
determined by consideration of interview and documentary sources.
Rationale: Voters look to community leaders for cues on issues like tax increases. Mayors 
and other well-recognized officials can marshal support among a variety of groups and 
help to squelch disagreements among political factions. Absent such leadership, voters 
may perceive an initiative to be relatively unimportant or may be more likely to receive 
cues from opposing groups.
4. Total fundraising (near $1 million?)
Definition: Fundraising for the transportation tax initiative nears or exceeds $1 million. 
This figure is admittedly arbitrary, but was suggested a priori during the previous study 
and seems to represent a clear psychological threshold. Not every community of interest 
makes this data available in a reliable manner, so the accuracy of this factor may be a bit 
misleading. Furthermore, there is no control for size of community or strength of opposition 
as this would create far too many values. However, each of the communities in the study is 
one of the larger cities or urban counties in the U.S., and opposition funding is frequently 
miniscule.
Rationale: Effective campaigns require significant expenditures for consultants, research, 
publicity, media, direct mail, etc. This is particularly true with tax increase initiatives that 
voters may oppose unless they are confident the funding will have a substantial impact on 
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a high priority problem. Because it is often easy for opponents to attract media attention 
without spending much money, a poorly funded campaign can easily fail.
5. Recent initiative experience
Definition: Some communities put another tax initiative on the ballot shortly after a preceding 
effort. Because there is rarely reason to do this if the preceding effort was successful, this 
typically is done after an unsuccessful prior effort. Documentary analysis and interviews 
were used to determine whether communities had conducted a transportation tax campaign 
in the two to three years preceding the election analyzed in the current study.
Rationale: The experience of creating a proposal and carrying out a campaign enables 
supporters of a tax initiative to learn from their mistakes (or successes) and make necessary 
adjustments to either the transportation package, the campaign strategy, or both in order 
to prevail the next time around. Some observers believe that voters are more likely to 
approve of a second proposal after rejecting the first because they feel they are getting a 
better “deal” from public officials. Communities without such experience are more likely to 
make major mistakes, typically by proposing overly ambitious projects without adequate 
grass roots support. In addition, much can be learned about the arguments used by the 
opposition when a recent prior campaign exists.
6. Support from environmental groups
Definition: Local environmental groups endorse and/or campaign for the measure and 
no significant opposition exists from such groups. Interviews with campaign leaders, 
newspaper and other documentary accounts were used to determine whether such groups 
provided an unmistakable endorsement for (or against) each community’s proposal.
Rationale: Many communities have active environmental groups that endorse and 
offer support for transportation tax measures; this support can provide a cue for some 
voters, while its absence can signal political dissension and potentially negative publicity. 
Opposition by environmental groups of a transit-only measure may seem credible to voters 
because such groups tend to be perceived as being pro-transit. At the same time, this 
perceived pro-transit orientation may lessen their credibility as supporters of a transit only 
ballot measure.
7. Multimodal proposal
Definition: The tax initiative contains a proposal for funding of more than one mode 
of transit. (The inclusion of a highway component is considered separately under the 
next factor, “highway funding.”) Thus, the definition of “multimodal” is a narrow one that 
essentially considers whether a bus component is included in the package in addition to 
the substantial rail component that all proposals in this study contain by design. This is 
determined through review of the proposed legislation, along with supporting discussion 
with interviewees and review of other documents.
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Rationale: Multiple modes attract different kinds and groups of voters. Whereas many 
voters prefer rail transit, many existing transit users are reliant on bus routes that may not 
be served by future rail routes. In addition, it is much easier to provide benefits throughout 
a geographic area when a bus component exists. Finally, inclusion of a bus component 
tends to create more of a challenge for the opposition, which typically focuses its criticism 
on rail transit.
8. Highway funding
Definition: Proposal (or companion proposal) contains funding for highway improvements 
or additions, along with transit elements. This is determined through review of the 
proposed legislation, along with supporting discussion with interviewees and review of 
other documents.
Rationale: Providing funds for highways helps allay opposition from opponents of transit 
systems; it is also a way of spreading benefits that may be concentrated in transit systems, 
thereby broadening potential support. Failure to include funds for highway improvements 
risks alienating transit nonusers, who are typically a majority.
9. Benefits distributed throughout area
Definition: The proposal contains provisions for transportation improvements that are 
dispersed throughout a wide portion of the jurisdiction voting on the measure. In practice, 
this is generally measured by distinguishing between proposals that focus funding on a 
specific route or routes from those that would fund a wider swath of routes and other 
improvements.
Rationale: Distributing the traffic relief, transportation, economic and other benefits 
associated with transportation tax measures helps to broaden the political base of support. 
Failure to disperse benefits may lead to geographically based pockets of opposition, 
creating divisions among voters.
10. Sunset provision of 20 years or less
Definition: Proposal contains a time limit of 20 years or less on the imposition of the tax; 
this is primarily determined through review of the proposed legislation. For the current 
report, 20 years is used as the threshold rather than the 10-year figure in the previous 
report, because empirically few, if any, projects use such a short timeframe. Essentially, 
the issue is whether a proposal includes a sunset provision of any kind or duration or not.
Rationale: Voters are more likely to support measures with finite time limits, particularly 
with rail transit when the community has little or no prior experience with this transit 
mode. Indefinite tax periods make the measure more vulnerable to opponents’ charges of 
unlimited taxation for the proposal.
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11. Extension of existing rail system
Definition: The community had a rail line or lines prior to the most recent ballot measure. 
For this report, we define this to further include communities with rail lines already under 
construction where it was unclear whether the lines were actually running or not.
Rationale: Voters are more likely to support an incremental improvement than creation of 
a system de novo. Creation of a new system is more vulnerable to opponents’ arguments, 
whereas an existing system can presumably stand as an example of success, or something 
that voters have already approved.
12. Lack of problems with existing transit system
Definition: Some transit agencies develop a reputation for poor management (deserved 
or not), or have been beset by controversy about service levels, routing decisions, empty 
buses, inefficient use of resources, etc. Of a group of subjective indicators, this one is 
perhaps the most subjective. To determine whether it was present, the authors relied upon 
interviews with knowledgeable residents and officials, as well as reviews of newspaper 
and other documentary accounts.
Rationale: Keeping a positive image of competence and efficiency helps instill trust in the 
electorate. Conversely, any negative publicity can promote lack of trust and provides an 
easy target for opponents.
13. Extensive stakeholder participation in development of package
Definition: The extent to which the business community, environmental groups, transit 
users, citizens, and elected officials are involved in the planning process used to develop 
the transportation package. Holding public hearings, which is almost always done, is not 
sufficient or necessary for extensive public participation. However, the use of surveys to 
make important decisions about the package could constitute extensive citizen involvement. 
Yet, extensive citizen involvement does not, by itself, constitute extensive participation if 
other stakeholder groups are not involved.
Rationale: Important stakeholders, such as the business community, environmental 
groups, and elected officials expect to be involved in the process. Because adjustments and 
compromises to whatever was originally envisioned by supporters may need to be made, 
it is important to get agreement from relevant groups that the compromise is acceptable 
before going forward with the package. Systematic input on citizen preferences through 
surveys obviously is relevant because these populations will eventually express their views 
through their ballots. At the same time, preferences expressed through surveys may not 
always be reliable. For example, a survey conducted by Santa Clara County supporters 
in 2006 indicated very strong support for a measure that was ultimately defeated in a 
landslide.9
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14. Congressional or presidential election
Definition: A measure is placed on the ballot to coincide with a congressional or 
presidential election, as opposed to an off-year “special” election.
Rationale: Two different rationales exist. First, placing an issue on a special election ballot 
further isolates the issue, which may enable opponents to garner free publicity for their 
cause because there are fewer distracting events. Opponents almost invariably need at 
least moderate coverage of the ballot measure in the news media because they typically 
have little if any funding available for advertising. Second, transit dependent citizens are 
likely to support these ballot measures and this segment, as well as other segments likely 
to support these measures, may be more likely to vote in a general election than in other 
elections.
15. Consultant with initiative experience
Definition: The campaign for the transportation tax measure is managed by a consultant 
who has successfully managed prior (local) initiative campaigns. (The prior campaign 
does not necessarily need to be a transportation initiative.) This was determined through 
interviews with campaign officials and other observers.
Rationale: The complex decisions entailed in a tax increase campaign require the judgment 
of an experienced professional.
16. Use of media 
Definition: The campaign makes extensive use of both: (a) direct mail advertising that 
is targeted to selected audiences on the basis of survey research, and (b) television 
advertising for general audiences. Other means of communication may also be used. 
Intuitively, this variable is undoubtedly highly correlated with several previous factors. 
Extensive use of both television and direct mail cannot be made without a sufficient budget 
and experienced consultants will almost invariably use both direct mail and television 
advertising when a sufficient budget does exist. Nevertheless, past experience suggests 
that some campaigns will not use a variety of media and rely too heavily upon one form 
of media over all others. Evaluation of the presence of this factor was made via interviews 
with campaign officials and other observers, along with some review of newspaper and 
other documentary accounts.
Rationale: Television advertising helps create general awareness and enables the 
campaign to publicize its overall message, while targeted direct mail enables focusing on 
key demographic groups that may “swing” support for the measure. Over reliance on a 
single medium fails to capitalize on both of these potential strengths; particularly, failure to 
use direct mail risks an overly broad message that fails to move key demographic groups.
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17. Unorganized, poorly funded opposition 
Definition: Opposition to the tax measure is disorganized, under-funded or nonexistent. 
Given the existence of at least some opposition in early every campaign, a judgment must 
be made about the effectiveness of such opposition. Whereas using the amount of funds 
raised by the opposition as a means of classifying cases on this variable is possible as 
an objective means of classification, it is not a good indicator of the effectiveness of the 
opposition. The effectiveness has been evaluated using: (a) the degree of effort exerted by 
the opposition particularly in attempting to get their message heard; (b) their prominence 
and credibility within the community; and (c) the arguments used.
Rationale: Because the opposition almost always has little funding available for advertising, 
it must rely on grass roots means of communication along with extensive news coverage. 
These means of communication require both energy and credibility.
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In this section of case study narratives, emphasis is placed on evaluating the role played 
by factors described in the previous section. The following set of symbols is used to 
characterize whether (a) the condition specified by each factor was present, absent, or 
inconclusively present and (b) whether the presence or absence of that factor coincided 
with the outcome speculated to be associated with it. The same symbols are used later in 
this report to help assemble generalizations about the relationship between each factor 
and the outcome of transportation tax initiatives.
1. é  Condition existed, outcome consistent with expectation.
2.   Condition present, outcome inconsistent with expectation.
3. ê  Condition absent, outcome consistent with expectation.
4.   Condition outcome inconsistent with expectation.
5. ó  Condition inconclusively or ambiguously present.
The following examples illustrate the use of these symbols:
In the 2004 Maricopa County case, funding for the pro-transit campaign exceeded one 
million dollars, and the tax was approved by voters, consistent with the expectation. 
(“Condition existed, outcome consistent with expectation.”) é
The 2008 St. Louis County election occurred in the context of a Presidential election; 
however, the measure was not approved by voters. (“Condition present, outcome 
inconsistent with expectation.”) é
In the 2008 Kansas City case, the transit tax proposal did not include a multi-modal 
component. Consistent with the expectation, the measure lost. (“Condition absent, outcome 
consistent with expectation.”) ê
In the 2007 Charlotte case, there was no sunset provision associated with the tax measure. 
However, the tax survived the referendum, despite this expectation. (“Condition outcome 
inconsistent with expectation.”) ê
In the 2008 Santa Clara County case, the transit agency (the Valley Transportation Authority) 
had been issued a negative assessment by an auditor a year or two before the election, 
but the agency had made strides in improving its service and was enjoying increased 
ridership. Therefore it is unclear whether the factor of “lack of problems with transit agency” 
was at play in this case. (“Condition inconclusively or ambiguously present.”) ó
é
ê
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CASE STUDY 1: MARICOPA COUNTY (2004) – BIG VICTORY FOR AN 
AMBITIOUS PLAN
Introduction
In November 2004, voters in Maricopa County, Arizona (including the Phoenix, Arizona 
metropolitan area) voted to extend a ½ cent sales tax that had originally been approved by 
voters in 1985. Unlike the 1985 measure, which entailed almost exclusively spending for 
highway construction, the 2004 legislation funded a diverse set of multimodal transportation 
improvements, including light rail construction as well as enhanced bus service and 
additional freeway construction. Ultimately, Proposition 400 passed by a near-landslide 
margin of 57 percent in favor.
The Transit Package
The transportation improvements created by the 20-year extension of the ½ cent sales 
tax for Maricopa County residents was to result in additional estimated revenues of up to 
$14.3 billion. Generally, the package was to support projects associated with an existing 
long-range plan that had been created by the region’s Metropolitan Planning Organization, 
the Maricopa County Association of Governments. However, for the first time, this revenue 
stream would represent a major commitment to transit projects as well as highways and 
streets.
Funding was slated to support (1) new construction of or improvements to freeways (56.2 
percent), (2) improvements to arterial surface streets (10.5 percent), and to (3) transit, 
including light rail and bus services (33.3 percent). More specifically with respect to rail 
transit, the proposal was to fund 57.7 miles of new light rail construction. As a result, 
this project conformed positively to every “transportation package” factor associated with 
passage of transportation tax initiatives in the 2001 MTI study.
Multimodal proposal é
In addition to funding construction and improvements of highways and streets, the proposal 
included the light rail extensions mentioned earlier as well as a new regional bus service. 
The bus service was to include local, conventional bus rapid transit (BRT) as well as 
freeway BRT. Voters were presented with a panoply of transportation benefits.
Highway funding é
Voters were presented with significant upgrades to highways and freeways. The highway 
component included construction of additional 490 lane miles, 530 general-purpose-lane-
miles, and 300 lane-miles of high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) widening. Voters who could 
not envision benefits from transit enhancements were presented with significant benefits 
for drivers throughout the region. Nevertheless, local newspapers frequently referred to 
the tax proposal as a “transit tax.”
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Benefits distributed throughout area é
Similarly, the package was extremely diverse with respect to the geographic locale of 
its impact. The road improvements were distributed across a wide swath of the county, 
including high-profile projects such as a tunnel to relieve congestion at the Scottsdale 
airport, a major freeway (State Highway 101 “Loop 101”) would be widened and its key 
interchange with State Highway 202 improved. These locations would present benefits to 
both the West and East Valley areas of the county, surrounding Phoenix. On the transit side, 
the projected $2.3 billion would create express bus service that would link suburban areas 
to employment centers. The light rail addition, primarily in Tempe, would complement that 
being constructed in Phoenix, funded by a previous tax approved by residents of that city.
Sunset provision of 20 years or less é
Consistent with the measure that it was replacing, the proposal contained a 20-year sunset 
provision.
Extension of existing rail system é
As mentioned earlier, the proposal was to create additions to a rail system that was already 
under construction in Phoenix. But this was the first time that rail transit would extend into 
one of the more suburban cities in Maricopa County. Nevertheless, light rail had already 
won support in two elections within the county, and it is fair to characterize this as an 
extension rather than as a new system per se.
Extensive stakeholder participation in development of package é
The project received considerable input from both transportation leaders, interested 
stakeholders in the business community. Essentially, the project had already been 
extensively reviewed by its inclusion in an existing long-range plan that had been created 
by the region’s Metropolitan Planning Organization, the Maricopa County Association of 
Governments.
Transit Environment
Maricopa County is the fourth-most populated county in the U.S., and represents 
approximately 75 percent of the entire population of the state of Arizona. It includes 
the major cities of Phoenix, Glendale, Mesa, Chandler, Scottsdale, Gilbert, and Tempe. 
Regionally, the city of Phoenix had taken the lead by passing a tax increase that had 
enabled construction of a major new light rail system (documented in the 2001 MTI report).
Lack of problems with existing transit system é
Since 1993, “Valley Metro” was the identity associated with all regional transit in Maricopa 
County. All buses and other transit vehicles share the same logo and color scheme to help 
create a regional identity that residents can recognize. As a system, Valley Metro, enjoyed 
a generally positive image, as confirmed by positive votes for transit improvements in 
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Phoenix (in 2000) and Tempe (1996) in recently preceding years. Additionally, Mesa had 
passed a “quality of life” half-cent sales tax in 1998, with a small of revenues dedicated to 
transit, and Glendale had passed a ½ cent tax dedicated for transit in 2001.
Congestion “crisis” é
Maricopa County has been one of the fastest growing urban centers in the US for several 
decades. However, in 2004, Maricopa County was in the middle of a major population 
explosion; between 2000 and 2007, its population grew by nearly 800,000. In 2004, Phoenix 
metropolitan area subsumed by Maricopa County ranked fifteenth nationally in annual 
delay due to traffic congestion and fourteenth in costs associated with traffic congestion.10
Recent initiative experience ó
Although as an entire governmental entity Maricopa County had not experienced a 
transportation tax initiative campaign since 1994, when a ½ cent  increase for highway and 
transit funding was defeated by voters, several key localities and their leaders certainly 
had. Most importantly, Phoenix, Glendale and Tempe had each successfully launched 
transit tax campaigns in the eight years preceding the 2004 election for Proposition 400.
The Campaign
The campaign for Proposition 400 received protean support and leadership. Not only did 
the business community embrace the measure, it assumed a political leadership role that 
it shared with nearly every major local elected official in the area.
Sponsorship by the business community é
The area business community was heavily involved and invested in the proposal. Several 
kinds of business associations comprised this support, including the local Chambers 
of Commerce, the Association of General Contractors (AGC), and construction and 
construction consulting firms. In addition to contributing millions of dollars (as described 
below), the business community provided political leadership in the form of individuals 
from these groups who acted in a high-profile capacity during the campaign.
Sponsorship by key elected officials é
Political leaders in Maricopa County were generally quite supportive and united in their 
support for Proposition 400. First, the Proposition was enabled by the efforts of key state 
legislators who helped pass state legislation authorizing the tax initiative. Mayors of the 
largest cities in the county, especially that of Phoenix, joined the campaign for passage.
Perhaps the region’s most prominent elected official is the mayor of Phoenix. In 2004, 
that office had recently passed from Skip Rimsza, who left due to term limitation after 
10 years of service, to Phil Gordon. Both were staunch supporters of mass transit and 
the light rail system. Gordon, however, took something of a backseat in leadership of 
the pro-Proposition 400 campaign in favor of Rimsza, who had a longer track record as 
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an advocate (and perhaps less to lose than the recently elected Gordon). In any event, 
support for the Proposition was clear and vocal from the region’s political leadership.
Total fundraising (near $1 million?) é
Because of the unusually large amount of funds available to the opposition (see section 
on opposition below), supporters of Proposition 400 probably needed to exceed the $1 
million threshold. Due to the wide-ranging coalition of supporters they had assembled, 
Proposition 400 supporters were able to garner a vast war chest of over $4 million.
Support from environmental groups é
High profile environmental groups such as The Sierra Club backed the proposal. Of 
particular note was an enthusiastic endorsement from the local environmental issues 
association “Valley Forward,” which boasts a membership of “large corporations and 
small businesses, municipalities and government agencies, educators, non-profits and 
concerned individuals.”11
Consultant with initiative experience é
HighGround Public Affairs Consultants, an Arizona firm that had also successfully 
assisted with the passage of a variety of local initiatives (including transportation-related 
ones) was the lead consultant on the campaign. Additional expertise was contributed by 
David Schwarz, who helped liaison with the local transit community and Alan Wulkan, 
an experienced transportation initiatives consultant who led local construction consulting 
engineers.
Use of media é
With its enormous campaign fund, the supporters’ campaign was able to invest in a 
massive infusion of advertising, including direct mail and broadcast media outlets. The 
media message focused on melding the need for both road and transit improvements. 
The overall strategy was to impress upon voters that transit and roads were “married and 
worked well together.”12
Unorganized, poorly funded opposition ê  
Although the opposition could be characterized as less than well organized, it was certainly 
not poorly funded. An individual opponent that was fiercely and specifically opposed to the 
light rail portion of the proposal wrote two separate $1 million checks to fund a barrage of 
commercials on television and other media. That alone made opposition to this measure 
one of the most heavily funded on record, and it forced the supporters to raise far more 
than the typical campaign might have been expected to. That being said, the opposition 
did not create an organized, grassroots campaign – it focused on media spots.
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Evaluation
This election seems to pose a textbook example of an alignment of factors that would 
portend a successful outcome, so the convincing victory (57 percent in favor) of Proposition 
400 comes as little surprise. Indeed, of the 17 factors associated with electoral success 
identified in the 2001 MTI report, 15 were solidly in place in manner consistent with success 
for the supporters’ campaign. Only two factors were either ambiguous (recent initiative 
experience) or anomalous (lack of a well-funded opposition).
Of those two, as the earlier discussion suggests, one could even make the case that 
collectively, officials in Maricopa did have sufficient recent experience with the imitative 
campaign process to succeed. Moreover, the lack of a well-funded opposition in this 
instance, notable by the sheer amount of the opponent’s campaign fund (at least $2 
million) might have helped to enable defeat at the polls, had the supporters not marshaled 
more than twice that amount from their own well-organized and broad-based support in 
the community.
With an area hard-hit by population growth and traffic congestion, a well-funded, high-
profile campaign blessed with visible political leadership, and a transportation package 
that presented tangible benefits throughout the region, Proposition 400 turned out to be a 
slam dunk.
CASE STUDY 2: PROPOSITION 1 IN SOUND TRANSIT DISTRICT (2007) – A 
SOUND INVESTMENT?
Introduction
The 2000 MTI study included an analysis of a transit tax initiative that passed in Seattle in 
1996; this case study returns to the Seattle area to examine a failed 2007 measure. As the 
2000 study chronicled, after failing to pass an ambitious, hurried, multimodal proposal in a 
special election in 1995, in 1996, the voters of the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit 
Authority (RTA) district passed a more modest ($3.6 billion) and regionally balanced 
proposal containing commuter rail, express bus service, improvements to HOV lanes, 
and light rail. This package, deemed “Sound Move,” is funded by sales and motor vehicle 
excise tax increases.
In the years between 1996’s “Sound Move” and 2007’s Proposition 1, a number of important 
events occurred. Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority, (encompassing parts of 
King, Pierce and Snohomish Counties) transitioned to the popular designation “Sound 
Transit” (ST) with the ST express bus series launch in the late 1990s. Sound Transit’s initial 
light rail build (Central Link, connecting downtown Seattle to Tukwila) ran well over budget 
and behind schedule and was forced to undergo a controversial revised cost estimate and 
downsizing process in 2001.13
Backlash to Sound Transit’s perceived mismanagement was severe enough to incite a 
2002 vote in favor of capping Vehicle Excise Taxes at $30. This provision posed a threat to 
20 percent of Sound Transit’s budget, but was ruled unconstitutional and unenforceable in 
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early 2003.14 Also in 2002, the Washington State Legislature passed ESSB 6140 creating 
the Regional Transit Investment District (RTID) to develop roads improvement proposals 
for the counties whose urban areas comprise the Sound Transit District.15
The cost of the full Central Link route approached $5 billion in 2007, with the initial segment 
not set to open until 2009. In the context of previous questionable finances and not fully 
financed proposals contained within, Proposition 1, which would have represented the 
largest tax increase ever in the state of Washington, was greeted by a skeptical electorate 
and defeated 45 percent to 55 percent.
The Transit Package
The 2006 Washington State Legislature required RTID to work in partnership with Sound 
Transit beginning in June 2006 to jointly submit a comprehensive transportation and highway 
plan to voters in the November 2007 election, essentially combining two ballot measures 
under one proposition title. Sound Transit primarily developed plans for 50 miles of new 
light rail services and park-and-ride facilities under the project title “Sound Transit 2–Making 
Connections.” RTID focused on 186 miles of highway expansions, including HOV lanes 
and improvements to the pivotal 520 floating bridge connecting Seattle and Medina under 
the project title “RTID Blueprint for Progress.” The resulting package, nicknamed “Roads 
and Transit,” amassed a base cost of $18 billion in 2006 dollars, including nearly $10.8 
billion for Sound Transit’s Link Light Rail.16 The projects would be funded by a combined 
6/10 of a cent sales tax increase and an increased, universal vehicle excise tax of $80 for 
every $10,000 of vehicle value for a projected period of 20 years. The remaining financing 
relied on state and federal government grants, and matching funds non-withstanding did 
not account for $1.5 billion of the projected cost.17
Multimodal proposal é
The package included $40 million for route expansion and service increases of Sound 
Transit Express Bus in King County, which includes Seattle. An additional $15.5 million 
would have been allocated to community buses or vanpools in Snohomish County. While 
the package was technically multimodal, the lion’s share (or over $10 billion) was to be 
dedicated to light rail construction.
Highway funding é
King County population centers Seattle and Bellevue are primarily connected by the 
Evergreen Point Bridge, known as the “520 Bridge” to local residents. Spanning Lake 
Washington, it is the longest floating bridge in the world and a primary point of congestion 
in the Puget Sound region. Improvement to this highway structure was the marquee project 
of the RTID Blueprint for Progress, which also included a number of smaller highway 
widening and expansion measures for regional choke points. Despite its prominence as a 
congestion point, improvement to the 520 Bridge was one of only three of RTID’s projects 
in Proposition 1 to not receive a full financing plan, with a $1.315 billion shortfall predicted 
in 20-year cost. In sum, this package contained extensive highway funding plans, although 
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the way these funds were allocated may have had a significantly negative impact on the 
package’s prospects.
Benefits distributed throughout area é
Sound Transit and RTID developed the package under the governing principle of “sub-
area equity,”18 meaning that tax revenue generated ought to be spent in the county in 
which it was raised. Seattle and Bellevue are located in King County, and would have been 
among the largest contributors of both sales tax and vehicle excise tax revenue within the 
Sound Transit District. In terms of number and dollar value, King County was to receive 
the greatest portion of projects. The benefits of this package would have been distributed 
equitably throughout Sound Transit District in both per capita effort to deliver congestion 
relief and a diverse array of light rail and highway projects serving population dense areas.
Sunset provision of 20 years or less ê
While estimated to collect over a 20-year period, Proposition 1 contained no official 
sunset provision. The Proposition was written so as to allow decreases in the sales tax 
collection rate if rail tax collection ran ahead of this 20-year schedule, and subjected roads 
expenditures of greater than 20 percent cost overrun to a revote by the electorate or 
approval of all three affected county councils. Before the depths of the current recession, 
there was speculation that Sound Transit would be running surpluses by 2035 and its 
governing board would be able to rollback sales tax rates.19
Extension of existing rail systems ó
Sound Transit’s initial Central Link Light Rail line connecting downtown Seattle to Tukwila 
(near the airport) was not set to open until 2009, in accordance with 2001 revised cost 
estimates.20 While this package entailed an extension of light rail, no part of the light 
rail system was in operation at the time of the vote. With just three-quarters of heavy 
construction having been completed a month before the November 2007 election and 
a train parked outside a new maintenance facility in the months leading to the vote, this 
factor was only inconclusively present.
Extensive stakeholder participation in development of package é
Sound Transit and RTID both worked extensively to incorporate public and targeted 
stakeholder input into development of their packages prior to and after combining forces. 
Each collected public comment via surveys, letters, community meetings and hearings 
in developing a slate of priority projects. Seattle professional sports teams and major 
corporations were involved in discussions of light rail access to their facilities. Planning 
and transportation agencies of the affected counties contributed to the engineering and 
design work of the proposal. This was a comprehensive five-year process.
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Transit Environment
The Seattle area is consistently ranked among the world’s most livable regions. At the time 
of the 1996 light rail vote, the Seattle urban area population was 2,570,000. In 2007, it was 
3,100,000 – a 20 percent increase. Congestion grew steadily and the numerous bridges 
spanning the Puget Sound experienced increased strain and rates of dilapidation, which 
left one with an “extremely unsafe” rating.
In addition to arguments in favor of bridge and highway improvements, Seattle had a 
series of votes pertaining to a “doomed” (inadequately financed) monorail system in the 
early and mid-2000s.21 The region was already familiar with pro-transit discourse by the 
time of the 2007 vote, therefore, but had also suffered a series of false starts in this regard.
Lack of problems with existing transit system ê
Sound Transit was the subject of various forms of controversy in the months leading 
up to the 2007 election. A Title VI Compliance Review dated February 2005 found that 
Sound Transit lacked standards of transit access and failed to measure impacts of service 
change on predominately minority communities. In January 2006, a citizen oversight 
panel proposed calculations for operation and maintenance inflation projections to be 
accounted for in Proposition 1 projects.22 Sound Transit used lower than recommended 
inflation presumptions, which contributed to a well-publicized dispute over the true cost of 
the package. While a number of news articles from the time indicate a sense of growing 
faith in Sound Transit since the RTA board’s appointment of CEO Joni Earl in 2001, several 
contain a lingering question of citizen trust in the system.
Congestion “crisis” é
Measurements for traffic congestion decreased somewhat in the Seattle area from the 
mid-1990s to the late 1990s, but were on the rise once again by the early 2000s. By 2007, 
total Congestion Cost for the Seattle urban area had risen to $1.59 billion, earning it 15th 
highest ranking in the U.S.23 Whereas the term “crisis” may only be most applicable to the 
conditions of certain key highway segments connecting larger cities, the sentiments of 
several Seattle area interviewees coupled with the State Legislature’s action creating RTID 
to specifically address traffic in the Puget Sound Region tend to confirm the existence of a 
“crisis” mentality in the area.
Recent initiative experience é
This was the Seattle region’s fifteenth vote on a transportation-related measure in a 
dozen years.24 Many of the same legislators, consultants and business community players 
involved in the Proposition 1 campaign were active in supporting Referendum 51 in 2002, 
a nine cent per gallon gas tax to fund highway construction, which likewise failed after an 
aggressive campaign. Another possible priming mechanism was at issue in 2006, when 
the Seattle Department of Transportation successfully spearheaded the ‘‘Bridging the 
Gap” initiative. This levy included some funding for transportation (increased bus hours), 
and roads and pedestrian projects (i.e., bicycle master plan, street resurfacing).
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The region’s pro-transit establishment was familiar with the initiative process, and its 
citizens relatively well versed in transportation discourse, which previous research has 
suggested correlates with increased chances of success. However, in the case of the 
Seattle region, it appears a long and spotty history in this regard may have been more 
harm than help.
The Campaign
Proposition 1 was one of few measures on the 2007 ballot. As it was the most closely 
contested item, it drew extensive coverage from local media. Polling from June 2007 
indicated that 57 percent of voters supported the measure, and that the two packages 
polled better together than separately.25 During summer 2007, the political action committee 
“Keep Washington Rolling” formed with the aim of raising several million dollars to funnel 
into the “Yes on Roads and Transit” campaign. The campaign was successful in forming a 
broad coalition, but lost at least one crucial group to well-funded opposition forces.
Sponsorship by the business community é
The Puget Sound area business community was almost uniformly in support of Proposition 
1. Microsoft Corporation and its executives contributed $500,000 to the Yes on Roads and 
Transit campaign.26 Notably, one of the proposed light rail builds featured a terminus near 
Microsoft’s main campus and a number of the highway projects would have eased the 
commutes of Microsoft employees. As was the case in 1996, major regional employer and 
business leader Boeing contributed a significant sum. Regional banking leader Washington 
Mutual lent its support. The Seattle Mariners organization also gave generously to the 
Yes on Roads and Transit campaign. Nearly every Chamber of Commerce located within 
Sound Transit District and several Labor Councils endorsed the measure.
MTI’s prior research has suggested that a nearly unanimous vote of confidence and 
unmatchable funds from the business community have been driving forces in the success 
in a number of light rail elections. However, this case demonstrates the influence one voice 
of dissent among the business community may assert. Eastside King County developer 
Kemper Freeman – a man with an acknowledged, longstanding vendetta against light rail 
– despised one proposed light rail project enough to dedicate his efforts and considerable 
resources to organizing opposition in defeating this package.
Sponsorship by key elected officials ê
While Proposition 1 received a broad base of political support, an accompanying depth 
of conviction or belief in the package was not evident. As early as April, legislators of 
both parties at the state and local level expressed doubts as to the cost-effectiveness, 
financing and timeliness of certain Proposition 1 projects. Sound Transit board chairman 
and Pierce County Executive John Ladenburg’s response was that the package “was in 
good shape.”27 Joint Sound Transit board member and RTID board member King County 
Councilmember Julia Patterson had worked in developing the package over five years 
and was among its few ardent supporters. While the vast majority of area political leaders 
supported the “Roads and Transit” package, King County Councilmember and supporter 
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Jane Hague may have best captured the general sentiment surrounding Proposition 1 in 
stating, “We sort of view it as an ugly baby, but it’s the best baby we’ve got.”28
One key elected official, former Sound Transit board chairman and known light rail 
proponent King County Executive Ron Sims, surprised everyone by submitting an opinion 
editorial to the Seattle Times titled “The roads-and-transit plan: so much cost to do so little.” 
He wrote, “While containing some good projects, this plan doesn’t solve traffic congestion 
in the short term, nor does it provide enough long-term relief to justify the financial and 
environmental costs.”29 One project he and the Sierra Club attacked was a proposed light 
rail line with projected trip duration longer than commuter rail and bus services in the same 
corridor. Sims later partnered with the Sierra Club, giving an encouraging speech to their 
leaflet-spreading volunteers.30
The depth of opposition from one key source may have greatly contributed to counteracting 
the lackluster support of the majority. Moreover, the measure appeared to lack a high 
visibility champion among the ranks of its elected supporters.
Total fundraising (near $1 million?) é
Yes on Roads and Transit raised and spent nearly $5 million, outspending opposition by a 
margin of greater than 6:1 and greatly exceeding the threshold total of $1 million.
Top contributors included:
• Washington Association of Realtors: $300,000
• Microsoft Corp.: $300,000
• The Boeing Co.: $175,000
• Laborers International Union: $155,000
• Operating Engineers Union locals: $135,000
• Bill Gates, Microsoft chairman: $100,000
• Steve Ballmer, Microsoft CEO: $100,000
• Washington Mutual, Inc.: $100,000
• Seattle Mariners: $89,000
• Washington State Labor Council: $60,000
Notably, opposition groups raised approximately $800,000–a far greater amount than the 
typical election of this type.31
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Support from environmental groups ê
The pro-rail coalition included some of the Seattle area’s progressive, pro-environment 
groups, but the Cascade Chapter of the Sierra Club, the Cascade Bicycle Club and 
Conservation Northwest took positions against the measure.32 Of these, the Sierra Club was 
most active in opposing Proposition 1, its leaders engaging in a number of public forums 
debating the ill effects of increased carbon emissions as a result of proposed highway 
expansions. Possible evidence of the effect of this opposition: an exit poll indicated that 
at least 6 percent of Sound Transit District voters opposed Proposition 1 due primarily to 
global warming concerns, creating a unique bloc of “pro-transit defectors.”33
Consultant with initiative experience é
The Yes on Roads and Transit Campaign utilized a number of consultants who had worked 
at all levels of government, including several media and policy consultants with experience 
in previous Seattle area transportation initiatives.
Use of media é
Due to these incredible fundraising efforts, both Proposition 1 proponents and opponents 
were able to afford far-reaching campaigns. Both ran television and radio ads, distributed 
leaflets or mailers, printed lawn signs and engaged in numerous public discussions which 
were attended by reporters of the major local news papers and filmed to be posted on 
YouTube. As Yes on Roads and Transit spokesperson Aaron Toso stated, “the Washington 
way is to allow for a lot of debate.”34
Yes on Roads and Transit television spots featured “everyday people” sharing stories of 
congestion problems that would be lessened by the passage of Proposition 1. Targeted 
television ads and mailers were distributed to different sub-areas of Sound Transit District 
relating how specific highway and light rail projects in the immediate vicinity would ease 
a citizen’s commute. Increased safety on improved roads was another key message of 
Proposition 1 proponents.
Unorganized, poorly funded opposition ê
Opposition to Proposition 1 came from three major citizen groups: Citizens Against 
RTID, Neighbors Opposing Proposition 1 and NoToProp1.org. NoToProp1.org led and 
coordinated opposition efforts, and was formed by independently wealthy Mark Baerwaldt, 
former proponent of extending Seattle’s monorail and former party to a lawsuit against 
Sound Transit. He pledged nearly $200,000 of his own money to defeating Proposition 
1.35 East Side developer and road advocate Kemper Freeman contributed more than 
$210,000 to NoToProp1.org through two of his companies.36 The two did not know each 
other prior to summer 2007, but were able to work together in coordinating anti-tax 
messages, advertisements and public appearances, with Baerwaldt serving as treasurer 
and spokesman and Freeman appearing in debates.
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The NoToProp1 campaign was able to partner in opposition with the Sierra Club and 
provide printed materials to its volunteers, creating an unlikely coalition of pro-roads/anti-
transit and anti-roads/pro-transit forces that felt Proposition 1 did not contain a proper 
balance of projects, and at too high an overall cost, but for different reasons.
In sum, Proposition 1 faced a much better-funded and well-organized opposition than do 
most transit tax campaigns.
Congressional or presidential election ê
The 2007 Puget Sound election was technically a general election, but this was the most 
closely contended item featured on a short ballot. A large body of research indicates that 
off-year, non-presidential elections tend to yield lower overall voter turnout, along with 
higher turnout among older, more conservative voters. However, campaign leaders did 
not concern themselves with this factor, as the package was essentially ordered to the 
November 2007 ballot by the Washington State Legislature.
Summation of Factors
The failure of the Proposition 1 (2007) in the Sound Transit District occurred despite the 
presence of the following factors generally associated with success from the 2001 MTI 
study:
• Congestion “crisis”
• Extensive stakeholder support in development of package
• Benefits distributed throughout area
• Multimodal proposal
• Highway funding
• Recent initiative experience
• Sponsorship by the business community
• Consultant with initiative experience
• Use of media
• Total fundraising (near $1 million?)
• The effect of one factor in this case was ambiguously, or inconclusively present:
 ◦ Extension of existing rail system
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The following factors, associated with passage in earlier research, did not accompany 
Proposition 1, and are consistent with the failed result:
• Sponsorship by key elected officials
• Support from environmental groups
• Lack of problems with existing transit system
• Unorganized, poorly funded opposition
• Sunset provision of 20 years or less
• Congressional or presidential election
This culminates to a total of ten anomalously present conditions, one ambiguous condition 
and six factors that were consistent with their expected outcomes.
Evaluation
When asked why Proposition 1 failed, Seattle area interviewees uniformly stated, “It was 
too big.” The comprehensive package, which would not have seen its 50 miles of light 
rail completed for decades, would have represented the largest local tax increase ever 
in Washington State. The loss of Sierra Club support and the unforeseen opposition from 
respected transit advocate King County Executive Ron Sims also appear to have harmed 
Proposition 1. The conflict over underlying financial assumptions creating a media stir and 
a lack of financing for pivotal projects also appears to have hurt the prospects for passage.
The fact that the vote came in an off-year election, which tend to yield higher turnout among 
older, more economically conservative voters, was also mentioned by some sources. As a 
caveat to this case study, Sound Transit returned to the ballot in 2008 (free of its legislated 
obligation to RTID) and was able to ride the progressive wave of candidate Barack Obama, 
particularly among younger voters, to an easy victory of a more modest, strictly transit 
package. (For a further discussion of this vote see the Rebound Election section.)
CASE STUDY 3: CHARLOTTE GROWLS AT ATTEMPTED REPEAL (2007)
Introduction
MTI’s 2001 study detailed the 1998 vote of Charlotte and surrounding Mecklenburg 
County that approved a ½ cent sales tax increase to fund the city’s “2025 Transit/Land 
Use Plan.” Since 1998 the plan, created Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC) has 
established strategies for smart growth and transit planning in the region, with operations 
and maintenance carried out by Charlotte Area Transit System (CATS), a department of the 
City of Charlotte created to replace the city Department of Transportation in 2000. Transit 
program approval and budgetary authority ultimately fall to both the Charlotte City Council 
and the Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners. Transit projects falling under the 
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purview of the tax include light rail (dubbed LYNX in accordance with the region’s big cat 
theme and in promotion of connectivity), commuter rail, street cars, bus rapid transit (BRT) 
and expansion of existing bus services along five corridors affirmed by the MTC in 2006. 
The “2030 Transit Corridor System Plan” was written in 2006 as an update to the “2025 
Transit/Land Use Plan.” The renaming of the transit investment plan reflects the indefinite 
nature of this tax increase and its failing to generate an originally projected $1 billion by 
2025 – key points of discontentment for opponents of public transit in Charlotte.
• As early as 2000, objections were raised that the MTC was allocating too much 
funding for light rail projects. In October of that year, nationally active anti-rail 
consultant Wendell Cox gave a speech in Charlotte as to the implausibility of the 
city achieving all its transit goals with its $1 billion target.37 This helped trigger a 
financial review of proposed projects and a shift in designation from the “2025 Plan” 
to the “2030 Plan.”
Construction of the first light rail segment, the South Corridor Line, ran well over budget 
and behind schedule, helping fuel the contention that Charlotte’s light rail system is not as 
cost-effective as other smart growth alternatives allowed by the 2030 Plan. In the spring 
of 2007, a local activist used his own funds to pay National Voter Outreach to collect the 
roughly 49,000 required to qualify a referendum repealing the tax on the November ballot. 
Later that year, the pro-repeal group Sensible Charlotte Area Transportation (SCAT) was 
somewhat successful in stirring community unrest over the merits of continued light rail 
construction.
While the repeal measure initially written off as the efforts of a fringe movement, it gained 
enough traction over the summer of 2007 to pull within a threatening distance, with most 
(unscientific) polls by October 2007 indicating just over half of Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
residents were in favor of keeping the tax. Thus the referendum’s November’s defeat by 
40 percentage points was surprising to all.
The Transit Package
In 2000, the Parsons Transportation Group was awarded a $5.8 million contract to perform 
engineering and environmental studies, and begin planning of stations and transit-oriented 
development housing for what would be the first light rail system in Charlotte, excluding 
an historic streetcar serving a less than two mile route.38 The final plan was originally 
scheduled for adoption by 2003 and operation of the light rail system set to begin as early as 
2005. However, a series of setbacks, including community concerns that centered around 
a lack of parking and bike storage in early station proposals and delays in finalization of 
agreements in federal and state matching funds, resulted in delay in adoption a final plan 
by the MTC until November 2006.
The first segment of LYNX light rail (the South Corridor, or Blue Line) was set to begin 
operations in late November 2007, at a final cost of $521.85 million, an overrun of the 
2006-adjusted $462.7 million estimated cost.39
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Multimodal proposal é
Implementation plans from 2004 indicate desired establishment of light rail, commuter 
rail, or bus rapid transit services along each of the five corridors by 2012 with streetcar 
services to expand by 2025.40 The 2030 Transit Corridor System Plan’s revisions include 
delayed implementation of a planned streetcar loop for Center City, and noted the MTC’s 
decision to delay and further consider if the Southeast Corridor would receive BRT or LRT 
services (CATS). By 2007, existing bus services had been dramatically expanded and the 
first light rail line was nearly complete, but the vast majority of planned projects had yet to 
commence.
Highway funding ó
The MTC may dedicate sales tax revenues for high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, but 
highway widening is not among the priority projects of 2030 Transit Corridor System Plan, 
based on the belief that HOV lanes do not directly stimulate land use intensification to the 
degree of other projects allowed by the plan. As this package was crafted and promoted 
with public transit as the focus, therefore, the effect of theoretical highway funding is at 
best only ambiguously present.
Benefits distributed throughout area é
The five planned corridors connect a seven county region, creating a greater than 20 mile 
ring around Charlotte. The five proposed lines come from every direction to converge in 
central Charlotte locations. Lines would connect jurisdictions of four metropolitan planning 
organizations (MPOs) and could serve upward of 1.5 million residents.41 Future expansions 
of rail service are planned to University of North Carolina (UNC) Charlotte’s University 
City and Charlotte/Douglas International Airport. Theoretically, at least, this package is 
intended to spread service and economic benefits across the region.
Sunset provision of 20 years or less ê
This tax has no official sunset. The ½ cent increase was originally projected to generate 
enough revenue to complete all projects by 2025, and then 2030, but it is presently 
unknown when this tax will cease collecting. At present, the tax generates revenues of 
approximately $120 million annually,42 more than enough to keep the existing system 
elements in operation, but not necessarily allowing for timely new construction.43
Extension of existing rail system ó
In 1996, the city of Charlotte experimented with a resurrection of streetcar services along 
Norfolk Southern track. Ridership led CATS to continue streetcar service and purchase 
new rolling stock. The first light rail line is along the same corridor, which necessitated a 
temporary halt in streetcar services, but the two services now share LYNX tracks. As the 
South Corridor Line is a much longer route than the less than two-mile streetcar line, this 
could be considered an extension of exiting rail, but the effects of this factor are somewhat 
ambiguous.
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Extensive stakeholder participation in development of package é
MTI’s 2001 study noted that in 1994, Charlotte’s Planning Commission convened a 
“Committee of 100” civic leaders to generate stakeholder input in development of the 2025 
Transit/Land Use Plan. The group contributed to the identification of five key transit corridors 
and offered suggestions for improved and increased services. By 1997, the group’s proposed 
one cent sales tax increased was deemed infeasible and this committee’s membership 
dwindled to ten elected officials and business leaders who ultimately succeeded in getting 
the 1998 sales tax increase on the ballot. While the committee disbanded shortly after the 
1998 vote, stakeholder input pertaining to station design and accessibility were among the 
factors contributing to construction delays in the years leading to the repeal vote. Thus the 
original package was associated with extensive participation; the repeal effort emerged 
from the efforts of relatively few individuals.
Transit Environment
Charlotte is a relatively low-density (2,515.7/sq mi) area characterized by urban sprawl. 
Interests in the region feature several advocates of expansion of existing roadways and 
improved traffic signals over further public transit investment. In the months leading up to 
the November 2007 vote, the conservative research group The John Locke Foundation 
published a number of articles revealing what it characterized as egregious federal 
earmarks for this project. This, coupled with low rates of expected use, contributed to 
a growing sense among some observers that perhaps light rail transit was not the right 
solution for Charlotte.
Lack of problems with existing transit system ê
Charlotte had a bus system in existence before the 1998 tax increase, but the bus system 
pre-sales tax was small and in disrepair. By 2007, roughly 65 percent of the 2030 Plan-
dedicated sales tax revenue funneled into the much-improved bus system, featuring better 
stops and signage, and a fleet of 497 buses and vans.44 Also indicative of an upward trend; 
the system has received statewide acclaim for paratransit services every year beginning 
in 2007.45 However, in August 2007 (months before the vote), the Charlotte Observer ran 
an article stating that system ridership had increased 66 percent since 1998, but at an 
170 percent increased operating budget, calling to question the efficiency of a system in 
which costs were growing at a faster rate than income.46 Moreover, CATS had to contend 
with the negative publicity generated by the cost overruns and fiscal underperformance 
associated with the tax measure that resulted in the repeal effort. In the final analysis, 
the very existence of the repeal referendum created significant problems with popular 
perceptions of the transit system, although that impression may have ultimately proved to 
be illusory.
Congestion “crisis” é
Texas Transportation Institute data indicate that the notable congestion situation noted 
in the 2001 MTI study worsened steadily between 1997 and 2007. Over this period, the 
Charlotte urban area population rose from 720,000 to over 1,070,000, and its Travel Time 
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Index rose from 1.16 to 1.25, moving Charlotte from 38th to 25th ranked in the country. 
The area’s Total Annual Delay rose by over 260 percent over the same period. Perhaps 
most startling, the calculated Congestion Cost (an estimation of productivity value and 
excess fuel consumption lost to delays) leapt from $140 million in 1997 to $525 million in 
2007.47 Beyond this statistical evidence, interviewees articulated that a sense of frustration 
among Charlotteans existed concerning traffic patterns, commuting times, and other 
reflections of pervasive congestion, their support for additional transit system components 
notwithstanding.
Political Environment
The City of Charlotte is governed by a council-manager system, but as the only citywide 
elected executive official, the mayor wields significant political leadership. In November 
2007, Republican Mayor Pat McCrory, the popular light rail proponent that was instrumental 
to passage of the 1998 tax increase, was reelected to a record seventh term. General 
election challenges in the interim were based in anti-rail issue campaigns, and his challenger 
in the September 2007 Republican primary likewise tried to make rail the centerpiece of 
the mayoral election debate. As the Democratic challenger that November was also pro-
rail, the mayor did not champion the issue to the same extent as he had previously, while 
remaining a supporter of public transit.
Mecklenburg County is governed by a nine-member County Commission. Republicans on 
the Mecklenburg County Board of Commissioners were among the strongest proponents 
of repealing the transit tax. Their October 2006 attempt to consider a repeal referendum 
was stifled by the Democratic majority of the board, who felt this move was premature and 
an over-reaction to the latest bout of cost overruns.48
Recent initiative experience ê
Charlotte had not experienced a tax campaign since the last, successful one in 1998 and 
was therefore lacking this kind of experience. More specific to the special status of this 
case, citizen-led referenda in Mecklenburg County or elsewhere in North Carolina in the 
years leading up to the repeal vote were unprecedented. Citizen led efforts are uncommon 
in North Carolina, which had its first proposal allowing for initiatives amending the state 
constitution on the November 2010 ballot.
The Campaign
Jay Morrison, a wealthy software engineer and Republican activist, applied his background 
in Florida politics (where citizen-led initiatives are much more common) to Charlotte. He 
almost single-handedly brought about the “Stop the Train” petition drive. In March of 2007, 
he paid for political consulting firm National Voter Outreach to collect the verifiable signatures 
of 48,669 county voters. At the end of March, when the drive was near completion, Morrison 
told supporters he did not want credit for the measure, and was quoted, “I’m done with 
this. You can’t make me talk about it.”49 By this time he was contemplating a run for school 
board, and would only offer the following statement:
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We have misplaced priorities in Mecklenburg. We need to redirect our limited resources to 
building schools. Light rail is wasting billions of dollars at a time when Dr. Peter Gorman 
says he needs $2.5 billion for schools. I would say that our resources need to be redirected 
away from light rail and instead we should spend those dollars on new school construction.50
Unorganized, poorly funded opposition ó
Over the course of the summer of 2007, the loosely organized group Sensible Charlotte Area 
Transportation (SCAT) held a small number of community talks, some of them led by UNC 
Charlotte Transportation Engineering Professor David Hartgen. Hartgen was a member 
of the “Committee of 100” contributing to the development of the 2025 plan, and had then 
advocated for a sunset or trigger mechanism of the tax to measure its effectiveness. By 
2007, he was of the belief that the MTC and CATS were allocating too much money for 
light rail and were not implementing alternatives that could have been more effective in 
alleviating traffic congestion. His critiques were funded and distributed by the conservative 
John Locke Foundation, which also financed a pro-repeal speech by light rail critic Randal 
O’Toole and produced a series of online articles condemning the system.51
Other leaders of the repeal movement were former Charlotte Councilmember Don Reid 
and Mecklenburg County Commissioner Jim Puckett. The former was a frequent critic 
of public spending and the latter had received an $11,000 campaign contribution from 
Morrison.52 The majority of their influence came in the form of comments published in 
the region’s major newspaper, The Charlotte Observer. Additionally, State Senator Robert 
Pittenger, R-Mecklenburg, produced a TV spot questioning spending money on light rail 
before completing “crucial road projects.”
In July 2007, Morrison requested access to all of Mayor McCrory’s and the City Council’s 
emails on the subject of the transit tax. Charlotte Observer articles from the time indicate 
that the request irked the mayor. Within a week, the Observer revealed that Jay Morrison 
had come into his wealth as a serial litigator, and was involved in a shady credit scheme. 
The accusations led Morrison to drop his bid for school board and eventually to leave 
Charlotte.
Of note, an early Observer analysis of submitted signatures found them to be 
disproportionately from Democrats, women and African Americans. It was somewhat 
puzzling why these typically socioeconomically disadvantaged groups (who theoretically 
would stand to gain most from a public transit system) would be for a repeal process led by 
wealthy, white Republican men. It was later reported that many of the signature collectors 
went about asking voters to “sign this petition to lower the sales tax” and provided no 
explanation as to the specific ramifications of that action.53
Pro-repeal forces were weakly connected and leaderless after Jay Morrison walked away 
from the effort he began. Without a champion, the pro-repeal message quickly dwindled in 
public discourse on the issue. The campaign from anti-rail activists lost momentum over the 
course of summer 2007, and secured only $12,000 in almost entirely individual contributions. 
Apart from a series of blogs and articles featured on The John Locke Foundation website, 
SCAT did not appear to have maintained a unified or officially coordinated presence.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
38 II. Case Studies
In sum, this unique election, from the standpoint of transit tax measures, featured an 
opposition that was strong enough to qualify a repeal measure for the ballot and yet 
virtually dissolved by the time of the actual campaign for the repeal referendum.
The Anti-Repeal/Pro-Transit Campaign
In March 2007, realizing that a repeal vote was imminent, Mayor McCrory demanded 
that CATS present scenarios to the City Council detailing the effects of repeal. These 
alternatives effectively communicated that a repeal of the sales tax increase would lead 
to a likely increase in property taxes to maintain service levels, and could threaten the 
county’s credit rating, possibly leading to a repayment of state and federal funds and 
increasing the cost of future borrowing.54
The Charlotte Chamber of Commerce, which ran the 1998 campaign detailed in the 2001 
MTI study, took responsibility for its own lack of public information efforts leading to unrest 
in 2007.55 The Chamber ran the aggressive “Vote Against Repeal” campaign in partnership 
with members of the Charlotte City Council. As in 1998, the group succeeded in crafting a 
multifaceted pro-rail coalition.
According to the senior vice president of public policy with the Charlotte Chamber of 
Commerce, the Chamber committed a disservice in not making a public education effort 
after leading the 1998 campaign. The economic boom of the early 2000s invariably 
impacted the final cost of construction projects whose estimates were drawn in the mid-
1990s. As the original 2025 plan did not include specific routes or account for construction 
of pedestrian bridges and automobile accommodations, cost projections and delays 
continually increased in the years leading up to the repeal vote.
Sponsorship by the business community é
As noted in the 2001 study, Charlotte is one of the nation’s largest banking centers. Bank 
of America and Wachovia, as well as other banks with downtown locations, are regarded 
as critical voices in the local business community. Each donated $60,000 to the Vote 
Against Repeal Committee, leading a coalition of businesses that also represented the 
construction, hospitality and utilities industries.56
Additionally, local businesses provided volunteers to speak about the expected benefits of 
economic connectivity. The Chamber did not host any of its own events, instead maintaining 
a presence at every park festival and local church barbeque leading up to the election.57 
By limiting spending on personnel costs, the Vote Against Repeal Campaign was able to 
launch a series of targeted campaigns that employed various media.
Sponsorship by key elected officials é
Largely in response to the number of African Americans signing the petition to repeal, 
African American leaders in Charlotte-Mecklenburg banded together to form the African 
American Coalition Against Transit Tax Repeal.58 The Black Political Caucus of Charlotte-
Mecklenburg came out in favor of keeping the transit tax, and popular former Charlotte 
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Mayor Harvey Gantt delivered speeches to predominately African American communities, 
campaigning for the “bigger picture” benefits of public transit. The message, presented 
in more human terms, was this tax supports bus systems heavily relied upon by minority 
communities and is a key to economic and social mobility.
While not as fervent a supporter as in 1998, Mayor McCrory did reaffirm his pro-rail stance. 
He was assisted by Charlotte City Councilmember Pat Mumford, chair of the Vote Against 
the Repeal Committee. The majority of both the Charlotte Council and Mecklenburg Board 
of Commissioners were anti-repeal. A small number of state legislators representing 
Mecklenburg County were in favor of repeal, but were not as visible or vocal as Mumford.
Total fundraising (near $1 million?) ê
Big businesses funneled $600,000 dollars into the pro-rail media blitz in the weeks 
immediately preceding the repeal vote. Of note, CATS contractors Siemens ($50,000), 
Parsons Brinkerhoff ($30,000) and construction management firm STV ($30,000) all 
provided substantial contributions in protecting their interests.59
While this is definitely a significant sum, particularly when compared to the approximately 
$12,000 raised by repeal-advocates, it is not near enough the $1,000,000 threshold for 
the condition of excessive fundraising to be considered met. However, the fact that this 
election was a repeal referendum and not an initiative – and the apparently diminished 
profile of the opposition – may have relaxed the need to raise more funds.
Support from environmental groups é
One targeted campaign entailed reaching out to the North Carolina Sierra Club. The Chamber 
of Commerce did not have an existing relationship with the environmental community, 
which may often be demonstrably in conflict with business interests. By emphasizing the 
air quality improvements that light rail was expected to achieve, the Chamber attained the 
buy-in of the Sierra Club and was able to assist it in crafting an Anti-Repeal message to 
disseminate to its constituents.60
Consultant with initiative experience é
Councilmember Mumford was instrumental in hiring R&R Partners to construct a television 
campaign for the anti-repeal effort. This public strategies group was chosen for having led 
a successful transit campaign in Salt Lake City in 2000.
Use of media é
According to campaign leaders, the Vote Against Repeal Committee ran a series of television 
commercials from September onward urging voters to keep the transit tax. Playing up the 
local affinity for NFL football, one such ad featured Carolina Panthers President Mark 
Richardson asking popular former Panther Mike Minter for help in stopping the repeal. 
In the spot, Minter drives home the point that repealing the tax will cut bus service and 
increase traffic to Panther games.
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Another advertisement featured a conservatively dressed elderly woman entering a seedy 
Charlotte bar populated with the heavily tattooed and pierced. After a moment’s pause, the 
woman leans over to the bartender and says, “You know, we’ve got more in common than 
you think.” She then proceeds to roll up her sleeve and reveal a “Vote Against Repeal” 
tattoo.
Perhaps most effective, the last TV spot starred two popular former mayors of Charlotte: 
Richard Vinroot (a Caucasian Republican) and Harvey Gantt (an African American 
Democrat). In the ad, the two convene in a dark parking garage for an inconspicuous 
meeting to share a secret: vote against repeal.
The Vote Against Repeal Committee was able to target different areas of Mecklenburg 
with different pro-rail messages via direct mail as well. Specifically, it distributed a flier in 
the African American and lower-income senior communities that focused on cuts to bus 
service if the tax was repealed.
The anti-repeal camp maintained an online presence at VoteAgainstRepeal.com. The site 
enabled individual donations and specifically catered to university students and young 
professionals on the supposition that this demographic element wants a transit-oriented 
urban environment.61
Congressional or presidential election ê
The vote on repeal occurred simultaneously with the mayoral election on November 6, 
2007. The South Corridor LYNX line was set to begin operations that Thanksgiving weekend 
regardless the result of the vote. According to interviewees, this poor timing coupled with 
the aggressive pro-rail media campaign led to an aura of “let’s wait and see.” The election 
featured 24 percent voter turnout with only 38,000 voting for repeal, in contrast to nearly 
49,000 signatures that were required to place the measure on the ballot.
Support for the tax was ultimately strongest from the African American community (in which 
several precincts topped 80 percent of African Americans voting for keeping the tax) and 
among newcomers defined as those who had registered to vote in Charlotte after the 1998 
vote.62 Election day Observer quotes from African American voters reflect recognition of 
community reliance on the bus system and quotes from workers who have moved in from 
other major cities suggest that the latter were accustomed to and willing to pay more for 
quality public transit.
Summation of Factors
This case provides some replication of the findings from the original study, with the 
qualification that this election did not in itself represent a tax increase, but rather an 
attempted repeal. To provide consistency with other analyses treating anti-rail groups as 
the opposition, this summation of factors will be from a pro-transit/anti-repeal perspective.
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The case of the Charlotte 2007 anti-repeal vote featured a replication of the following 
positive factors from the 2001 study:
• Multimodal proposal
• Benefits distributed throughout area
• Congestion “crisis”
• Sponsorship by the business community
• Sponsorship by key elected officials
• Support from environmental groups
• Consultant with initiative experience
• Use of media
• Extensive stakeholder participation in development of package
Due to complicating circumstances, the effects of the following factors are ruled 
inconclusively present:
• Extension of existing rail system
• Highway funding
• Unorganized, poorly funded opposition
The following factors, which were associated with transit successes in the earlier research, 
were not in effect for this election:
• Lack of problems with existing transit system
• Congressional or presidential election
• Sunset provision of 20 years or less
• Total fundraising (near $1 million?)
The county had not voted on a sales tax repeal or any transit related initiatives in the time 
since the 1998 vote.
This yields a total of eight replications of the apparent effect of factors from the previous 
study, four inconclusive findings, and five anomalous conditions.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
42
II. Case Studies
Evaluation
The ability of the anti-repeal campaign to appeal to a wide range of citizens, and particularly 
to reaffirm African American support, was unassailable by the inadequate efforts of 
scattered opposition. Nonetheless, the 70-to-30 percent result was shocking to both sides.
The extent to which these results are a function of the unique “repeal referendum” status 
of this election cannot be estimated. Certainly the tax was at actual risk when the repeal 
qualified for the ballot and was polling at only about half in favor; supporters of the existing 
tax were fortunate that the opposition essentially self-destructed at about that time.
From the standpoint of the factors identified in the 2001 study, this case seems to best 
illustrate the importance of timely political leadership from both elected officials and the 
business community, along with the public’s perception that traffic congestion woes require 
an active transit system to be part of the public solution. Had that leadership not occurred, 
or was a transit solution not in the public imagination, the result might have been quite 
different.
CASE STUDY 4: AFFIRMATION VOTE FOR STEEL WHEEL IN HONOLULU 
(2008)
Introduction
After his 2004 election, Honolulu Mayor Mufi Hannemann made the construction of 
a passenger rail line a priority of his administration. In May of 2005, the Hawaii State 
Legislature passed a bill allowing the City and County of Honolulu (a consolidated entity 
encompassing the island of Oahu) to impose a .5 percent increase in the General Excise 
Tax (GET) for the specific purpose of improvements in public transportation.63 In August 
of 2005, the Honolulu City Council voted 7-to-2 to increase the GET from 4 percent to 4.5 
percent, to be collected over the period of January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2022, in order 
to fund a new transit system for population-dense southeastern Oahu.
Opposition to this increase arose almost immediately, largely centered in uncertainty as 
to what form the transit system would take. The mayor and majority of the council heavily 
favored an elevated steel wheel-on-steel (e.g., light rail) rail system,64 but a particular 
councilmember as well as local transit enthusiasts questioned the logistics of the proposed 
line.
An alternatives analysis report was presented to the Honolulu City Council in November 
2006. The report detailed the benefits of four different mode and alignment proposals, 
ultimately recommending an elevated light rail track over expansions of existing bus 
service. The council struggled with the issue in various ways, including appointing a panel 
of experts to consider a slate of four modal options for the recommended route: light rail, 
rapid bus transit (BRT) system, monorail or magnetic levitation. Debate was re-opened 
even after four of five on the panel recommended light rail. In April 2008, Mayor Mufi 
Hannemann stated that he would veto any proposal that was not steel on steel, affirming 
this project as his political legacy. Shortly thereafter, the opposition group Stop Rail Now 
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began collecting signatures to put a measure against rail on the November ballot. Their 
petition was rejected by the City Clerk and the court system. The anti-rail campaign was 
ultimately outspent by the City and various rail proponents by a ratio of 100 to 1. However, 
this opposition, coupled with Hannemann’s failure to win re-election outright (in a run-
off system) against anti-rail candidates in September, had the effect of persuading the 
Honolulu City Council to unanimously agree to place a City Charter Amendment affirming 
the public’s support of rail on the November ballot.
In the ensuing November election, Mayor Hannemann was easily re-elected in the run-off 
against his anti-rail opponent, and the citizens of Honolulu affirmed support for his steel 
wheel project with 53 percent of the vote.
This case is unique in that it entails an election that involves a tax that was already 
approved. However, had the project failed at the ballot box, it is not clear that the tax would 
also have necessarily survived and an alternate transportation system been implemented. 
In a real way, citizens of Honolulu were considering whether an investment in light rail 
transit should or should not be made.
The Transit Package
The new transit system was aimed to alleviate congestion primarily along Honolulu’s 
Lunalilo Freeway (H-1) via an elevated route connecting Kapolei (western Oahu) and 
downtown Honolulu. Of note, the Honolulu High-Capacity Transit Corridor Project is a 
major component of the greater Oahu Regional Transportation Plan 2030, approved by 
the Oahu Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) in April 2006. The 2030 Plan features 
a variety of highway, transit and development projects, with GET revenue slated to fulfill 
local funding requirements for a transit system serving the H-1 corridor. Solely at issue 
in this election was the form of system the GET revenue would finance. At issue was the 
first rail system on the island after over 40 years of debate and three previous attempts to 
implement a light rail system.
Multimodal proposal ê
While at the time of passage the GET increase was for a “to be determined” transit system, 
and different modes were advocated by various parties, at no point in the development 
of this package was it a multimodal proposal. Further, the bill passed by the Hawaii State 
Legislature in 2005 allowing for county level increases in GET expressly forbids the City 
and County of Honolulu from expending GET revenue on any transit system in existence 
prior to July 2005, meaning this revenue stream cannot fund existing bus transit.
Highway funding ê
As it is administered by the State of Hawaii, GET generated revenue has often been the 
proposed target of raids (primarily by the now former governor of Hawaii, but also state 
legislators) seeking to close budgetary shortfalls and finance other infrastructure projects, 
but has been thus far protected. Highway elements of the Oahu Regional Transportation 
Plan 2030 are to be funded from the state Highway Special Fund, the Honolulu General 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
44
II. Case Studies
Fund and county motor vehicle taxes.65 While opposition arguments included appeals for 
greater highway improvements, the GET increase is expressly intended for the new transit 
system.
Benefits distributed throughout area é
The proposed rail line will eventually serve a heavily populated 20-mile stretch of 
southeastern Oahu, which includes parts of six or seven of the nine council districts. There 
is general agreement that service to Honolulu International Airport, University of Hawaii 
at Manoa campuses, popular Ala Moana Shopping Center, and area community colleges 
will be beneficial to the majority of citizens of Honolulu, though estimates of expected 
congestion decrease have varied.
Sunset provision of 20 years or less N/A
The GET increase is slated to be in effect until December 31, 2022, rendering this a 16-
year commitment. However, as the GET increase was approved by the Honolulu City 
Council and the transportation mode affirmed by the voters of Honolulu, this provision was 
not a direct issue in this election.
Extension of existing rail system ê
There was no passenger rail system on Oahu prior to this vote.
Extensive stakeholder participation in development of package ó
The decision of the transit mode was subject to prolonged debate, but as the strong 
mayor threatened to veto anything other than his own proposal, extensive stakeholder 
participation was essentially not at play. A panel of experts was consulted to appease the 
concerns of the minority of the council and citizenry, but this action was viewed by most 
as a rubber-stamping motion. The opposition had its preferred ballot measure language 
forbidding the expenditure of GET revenue on a steel wheel system denied by the City 
Clerk, but was successful in forcing a vote affirming citizens’ preference for rail, rendering 
the existence of stakeholder participation ambiguous.
Transit Environment
More than 900,000 people reside within the City and County of Honolulu, with an estimated 
705,000 living within a 140 square mile metro area of southeastern Oahu.
Lack of problems with existing transit system é
Honolulu’s bus system, simply dubbed “The Bus,” has been twice recognized America’s 
Best Transit System by the American Public Transportation Association, possibly lending 
to both the credibility of a new public transit system and arguments for expansion of the 
existing one. Combating appeals for an expansion of bus services over a new rail system, 
Roger Morton, president and general manager of Oahu Transit Services Inc., stated, “bus 
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service cannot be expanded- there’s simply no more room on the road.”66 Honolulu’s 
Lunalilo Freeway (H-1) is among the most congested in the country in part because it 
features only three lanes in each direction and cannot feasibly be widened, leaving some 
form of elevated construction as the only viable alternative.
Congestion “crisis” é
Honolulu features a tangible congestion crisis. The urban area has a Travel Time Index of 
1.24, ranked 28th in the country. According to residents, trips that should take 20 minutes 
can take over an hour at peak commute times. One analysis recently ranked the commute 
along Honolulu’s Lunalilo Freeway (H-1) second worst in the country, behind only the 
Hollywood Freeway in California.67 Consensus exists that a number of measures will need 
to be enacted to combat expected population and associated congestion increases in 
coming years.
Recent initiative experience ê
Honolulu has been debating the issue of light rail since the 1960s, with three previous 
efforts failing largely due to poor economic circumstances. The most recent pro-rail push 
transpired in 1992, when the Honolulu City Council voted against a similar GET increase. 
November 2008 was the Hawaiian electorate’s first vote pertaining to mass transit. A 
possible priming mechanism occurred in the 2006 general election, when the people of 
Honolulu passed environmentally friendly Charter Question 8, which read:
Should one of the priorities of the Department of Transportation Services be to make 
Honolulu a pedestrian- and bicycle-friendly city, and should the powers, duties, and 
functions of the Director of Transportation Services include bikeway systems?
While passage of the measure indicates a growing acceptance of bicycle and pedestrian 
community alternatives, it is not transit specific and therefore does not qualify as recent 
initiative experience for the purposes of this analysis.
Political Environment
The state of Hawaii is predominantly Democratic. At the time of this vote, its U.S. Senators 
and Representatives were also Democrats, and both the Hawaii House and Senate were 
under firm Democratic control. Notably, the Republican Governor refused to support this 
project in the face of a slowing economy, a growing budget deficit and the prolonged 
debate leading to a stockpile of untouched funds.
The City and County of Honolulu features a strong mayor and council form of governance, 
in which a supermajority of the nine-member council tends to align with the mayor. While 
these conditions may seem auspicious for the passage of a Democratic mayor’s legacy 
rail project, opposition was fierce enough to make the vote over affirmation of steel wheel 
on steel rail the focus of that November’s election, generating more discussion than the 
simultaneous election of native son Barack Obama.
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The Campaign
After the series of events that led the City Council to place language affirming public support 
of a steel wheel system on the November ballot, The City of Honolulu embarked on a public 
information effort illustrating the rail project proposal. One such document compared the 
benefits of rail to those of a rubber tire (BRT) system and elevated High- Occupancy Vehicle 
(HOV) lanes, making the case for rail on the basis of being a proven mass transit solution. 
Another featured headers such as “Why is rail transit such an important investment in 
Honolulu’s future?” and “Why is rail transit considered eco-friendly?” Rail opponents, of 
course, felt that these brochures were decidedly biased.
Stirring an even greater accusation of media manipulation, The City of Honolulu did not 
release a somewhat unfavorable Environmental Impact Statement until three days before 
the general election – after 105,000 absentee ballots had already been cast. The report 
included promising job creation projections, but also detailed the necessary displacement 
of 80 properties. The nominee opposing Mayor Hannemann (and the steel rail system) 
exercised this opportunity to slam him with accusations of leading a dishonest government, 
but did not seek formal recourse.68
Upon learning that the affirmation vote was to be on the November ballot, community 
based non-profit Go Rail Go spearheaded efforts to generate a groundswell of support 
for the proposed steel wheel system. Go Rail Go volunteers took to the field to touch 
voters directly, utilizing a walk-piece (a hand delivered mailer) and cultivating support for 
rail with the understanding that Hawaii is a “talk story place,” where citizens need to see, 
feel and connect with an idea on a personal level to vote for it.69 This group also reached 
out to the bicycle and pedestrian community, landowners, development companies and 
environmental groups in constructing a pro-rail coalition.
Sponsorship by the business community é
The business community was largely and vocally in favor of the rail project. Many trades 
unions strongly support what is now the biggest infrastructure project in Hawaii, as they 
stand to benefit. Carpenters and other building trades did their own fundraising and radio 
and television advertisements, and provided critical communication with U.S. Senator 
Daniel Inouye (D), who now chairs the Senate Appropriations Committee and seeks 
ongoing support by the federal government.
Interestingly, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce stayed out of the fray until just before 
the November vote, ultimately lending its endorsement to the pro-rail coalition. Some 
members of the small business community were in alliance with the opposition group Stop 
Rail Now, but did not provide the manpower or dollars of the unions.
Sponsorship by key elected officials é
Mayor Hannemann pointedly and vigorously rejected any system that was not steel wheel 
on steel rail. Aside from the resolve of Hannemann, powerful allies on the Honolulu City 
Council included members Nestor Garcia, Gary Okino and Todd Apo, whose districts could 
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greatly benefit from the proposed route. These Councilmen put in appearances on behalf 
of the mayor at public forums in the months leading up to the election and led get-out-the-
vote efforts.
Also critical to the success of the pro-rail campaign were Kirk Caldwell and John White. 
While a member of the Hawaii House of Representatives, Caldwell was instrumental in 
passing the legislation that allowed the Honolulu City Council to increase the GET. Once 
his term was up in 2008, he became a spokesperson for Go Rail Go. John White was an 
active presence for Go Rail Go at Honolulu’s 32 neighborhood board meetings, and was 
considered a strong contender for Honolulu’s 2nd City Council district in 2010.
Total fundraising (near $1 million?) é
In addition to maintaining an attentive presence at community meetings, the City of 
Honolulu spent an approximately $3 million70 on its public information campaign, featuring 
direct mail and an online presence. It later spent $10,000 for the mayor’s televised “State 
of Rail” address in October 2009. The mayor also used his personal campaign funds 
to take out large advertisements in both daily newspapers, the Honolulu Advertiser and 
the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, that attacked opposition group Stop Rail Now as consisting of 
“ultraconservative groups” that supported the auto and oil industries.
Go Rail Go expended contributions in the hundreds of thousands from a number of pro-
rail organizations. The combined efforts easily exceed the million-dollar threshold for this 
factor.
Support from environmental groups é
Known to be otherwise fiscally conservative, Mayor Hannemann did not enjoy the strongest 
of relationships with the Sierra Club Hawaii Chapter or other environmental groups. 
The Sierra Club remained neutral through much of the campaign, eventually lending its 
endorsement to the pro-rail side, but not providing personnel. Non-withstanding, area 
interviewees deemed Sierra Club support immensely important. Another constituency 
specifically targeted by the Go Rail Go campaign was Honolulu’s growing bicycle and 
pedestrian community.
Consultant with initiative experience é
Go Rail Go was something of a lobbying entity prior to the 2008 election campaign, mostly 
encouraging the Honolulu City Council regarding transit-engineering specifications and 
smaller details of the rail project. The group sought to contract consultants with grassroots 
campaign and coalition development experience in guiding a successful vote affirming a 
steel wheel system. Justin Fanslau, a transportation policy and campaign expert with ten 
years experience working mostly on California sales tax increases for transit purposes 
was hired as a consultant.
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Use of media é
Go Rail Go produced a number of radio and television spots, and took a cue from the 
Obama campaign, turning to social networking sites and viral videos in courting younger 
voters. Go Rail Go provided materials to Obama campaign precinct captains, hoping to 
further court the progressive vote. The carpenters’ union was also particularly active in 
producing radio and television advertisements in favor of the proposal.
The two major local newspapers were decidedly pro-rail in their coverage of project 
developments, treating outcomes in the mayor’s favor as expected and allowing him to 
run advertisements attacking the opposition.
Unorganized, poorly funded opposition é
Before the City Council agreed to have citizens affirm support for rail, opposition group 
Stop Rail Now attempted to amend the Honolulu City Charter to specifically exclude the 
GET funds being used for rail. To get any measure on the November ballot, a citizen group 
needs to attain the authorized signatures of 10 percent of registered voters in Honolulu, 
or roughly 44,500 signatures, by August 1st. The leaders of Stop Rail Now thought they 
had met this criterion, but eventually the City Clerk rendered thousands of its signatures 
invalid and its petition was denied. After having trouble finding an attorney who would go 
against the mayor and pursuing court challenges in vain, the group shifted its focus to 
public education.
Stop Rail Now focused its efforts in a door-to-door campaign, gave testimony to the City 
Council and was also a constant presence at neighborhood association meetings, aided 
in technical matters by University of Hawaii at Manoa Professor Panos Prevedouros, the 
lone dissenter in the vote by the panel of experts. Movement co-chairs Dennis Callan and 
Michael Uechi appeared in local news interviews whenever possible, as the group was 
unable to afford television, radio or print advertisements.
The opposition in this case was at a severe fundraising disadvantage. Stop Rail Now 
raised $40,000, nearly half of which was provided by local retired businessman and transit 
enthusiast Cliff Slater.
While ultimately unsuccessful, rail proponents credit Stop Rail Now with using its minimal 
budget and volunteer force to affect an impressive showing. By focusing its education 
campaign in areas not directly benefiting from the rail line (such as western and northern 
Oahu), Stop Rail Now likely contributed to drastic differences in precinct reports.
By all accounts, the opposition’s efforts were not as organized or meticulous as those of 
rail proponents. However, by rousing the ire of citizens over the inflating cost of the project 
during a recession and questioning the logistics of the proposed route, the group was able 
to stir enough interest to make the rail vote “more top of mind than the election of Barack 
Obama.”71
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In sum, the opposition was successful in stirring debate, but was not a well-organized or 
well-funded group.
Congressional or presidential election é
The vote took place on November 4, 2008, simultaneous to the election of Hawaiian Barack 
Obama. The fact that a native son was standing for national office implies a potential 
amplification of the effect of this factor, whereas in reality the transit vote was seen as the 
more interesting contest.
Summation of Factors
This case provides substantial replication of the findings from the 2001 study, with the 
caveat that this election did not in itself represent a tax increase. (As such, the variable of 
‘sunset provision of less than 20 years’ was deemed a “non-applicable” condition.)
The case of the Honolulu 2008 affirmation vote featured a replication of the following 
positive factors from the prior study:
• Sponsorship by key elected officials
• Sponsorship by the business community
• Total fundraising (near $1 million?)
• Use of media
• Consultant with initiative experience
• Unorganized, poorly funded opposition
• Support from environmental groups
• Benefits distributed throughout area
• Lack of problems with existing rail system
• Congestion “crisis”
• Congressional or presidential election
The level of stakeholder participation, while arguably high in that the transit mode was 
subject to much debate in public forums, was also low in that opposition groups never 
saw a vote on their most favored alternatives or had their amendment language approved 
by the Honolulu political establishment, rendering this factor imperceptible and therefore 
inconclusively present.
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The following factors, which were associated with success in the earlier research, were not 
in effect for this election, which was nevertheless won by transit advocates.
• There is no existing rail system in Honolulu
• The City and County of Honolulu had not experienced a transit initiative in the recent 
past
• The proposal does not include multiple modes of transportation
The proposal did not include highway funds
This yields a total of 11 replications from the previous study, one inconclusive finding, four 
anomalous conditions and one non-applicable condition.
Evaluation
The Honolulu High-Capacity Transit Corridor Project deviates from the others studied in 
a number of ways. Chiefly, the vote in question did not directly bring about a tax increase, 
which had already been enacted by the City Council. This exercise simply affirmed that the 
people of Honolulu approved the mayor’s plan for applying GET funds to the construction of 
a light rail system. However, had the plan failed at the ballot, pro-rail politicians stated they 
would pull their support and be forced to consider other mass transit alternatives. Further, 
a “no” vote would have likely jeopardized federal funds earmarked for this project.72
This election contained a strong element of political involvement, and that went beyond the 
local level. Pro-rail advocates at the council, mayoral, state and federal levels have worked 
harmoniously to help guarantee the success of this project. That being stated, this case 
may serve as a prime example of the influence of ardent support of rail transit by a key 
political figure (i.e., the mayor) in a strong-mayor and council form of governance.
CASE STUDY 5: LOS ANGELES COUNTY PASSES MEASURE R “FOR 
RELIEF” (2008)
Introduction
In November of 2008, Los Angeles County voters approved Measure R, a ½ cent sales 
tax increase to fund a massive, countywide transportation and roadway improvement 
plan. Los Angeles voters had passed sales tax increases for public transit in 1980 and 
1990, but neither was as extensive as this proposal. As a two-thirds vote is needed to 
levy any new dedicated tax in California, and given the fallout of the national economy in 
September-October 2008, this case speaks to both successful coalition building in a large, 
diverse metropolitan area and the willingness of the citizens of Los Angeles to embrace 
new capacity in search of congestion relief.
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The Transit Package
In the 2005 mayoral election, current Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa’s campaign 
promises included increased funds for road repairs and modernized, expanded public 
transit, his cornerstone project being a “Subway to the Sea” that would connect downtown 
Los Angeles to coastal Santa Monica via proposed tunneling under major thoroughfare 
Wilshire Blvd. Immediately upon being sworn in, Mayor Villaraigosa exercised his authority 
to assume the chairmanship of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority (MTA or Metro) Board.73
MTA and independent organizations conducted polling in 2005 and 2007 attempting to 
establish specific projects and a funding model Los Angeles voters would support in 
realizing Villaraigosa’s vision of a comprehensive congestion relief plan. Vehicle license 
fee increases, carbon taxes and gas taxes were unpopular means in a time of high gas 
prices, but a sales tax increase consistently polled near or above two-thirds approval. A list 
of priority transit projects already existed in the form of unfunded 2003 CA Senate Bill 314, 
to which few adjustments were made to meet citizen and stakeholder demands.
Ultimately, the citizens of Los Angeles County approved a 30-year, $40 billion package 
with 67.93 percent of the vote.
Multimodal proposal é
Theoretically, 45 percent of the revenue generated by the tax increase is to be dedicated 
to transit capital and operations, encompassing the areas of new light rail and Bus Rapid 
Transit, and extensions of existing rail lines. Due largely to the influence of stakeholder the 
American Automobile Association (AAA), 20 percent of funds raised by the tax are slated 
to go to highway improvements. In a measure of appeasement to the Bus Riders Union 
(BRU), and concession to the fact that the majority of Los Angeles public transit is on 
buses, the package dedicates 20 percent of revenues to bus maintenance and operations. 
To maximize local buy-in, the package devotes 15 percent of revenues to miscellaneous 
‘local returns’ (i.e., signal synchronization and pedestrian improvements).
Highway funding é
According to MTA insiders and consultants, this package would not have earned the 
endorsement of AAA without the inclusion of at least a 15 percent highway funding 
component, and would likely not have earned the approval of Los Angeles voters 
without substantial freeway improvements. Historically, Angelenos have by-and-large 
supported instillation of HOV lanes and sound walls separating housing developments 
from perpetually widening freeways. Ultimately, these (and other) highway provisions will 
receive approximately $7.88 billion (or 20 percent) of generated revenues.
Benefits distributed throughout area é
While the system proposal sought to install the “Subway to the Sea” as the hallmark 
project, transportation leaders placed utmost importance in the development stage on 
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creating regional balance in project prioritization and monetary allocation. South Los 
Angeles and West Los Angeles were designated priority regions. Upon presentation to the 
13-member MTA Board (chaired by Villaraigosa and including three of his appointees) in 
July 2008, the package met resistance from board members representing the San Gabriel 
Valley (northeast of downtown) and East Los Angeles. San Gabriel Valley felt it would not 
receive a fair share of projects in dollar terms or priority status, whereas representatives 
of predominately lower-income, minority East Los Angeles felt it unreasonable that higher 
cost, higher profile projects were being awarded to the more affluent West Side.74 The 
proposal was approved for the November ballot by the MTA board on a 9-to-2 vote, with 
two abstentions.
Despite its apparent importance in the process, the MTA’s vote alone would not authorize 
the collection of any approved tax increase. That power is granted by the California state 
legislature, which needed to pass an accompanying statute of authorization raising the 
limit on LA County’s sales tax. West Side Assemblyman Mike Feuer’s bill met resistance 
in the state Senate from East Side politicians, rivals of Villaraigosa, and fellow Democrats 
wishing to include their pet transportation projects.75 Feuer was able to keep this from 
becoming a “Christmas Tree” bill, and it gained the approval of the legislature just days 
before the deadline allowing the tax to take effect at the proposed date, the first day of the 
next Fiscal Year, July 1, 2009.
Sunset provision of 20 years or less ê
This ½ cent increase was to be in effect for 30 years, until the end of FY 2038–2039. It is 
projected to generate $40 billion in revenue, of which 1.5 percent (or $600,000,000) will 
cover administrative costs.
Extension of existing rail system é
Four of the 14 transit capital projects described in the MTA Expenditure Plan are extensions 
of existing rail lines, and one project, dubbed the “Regional Connector.” will link the four 
lines which converge in central Los Angeles.
New construction projects were given higher priority than extension of existing lines. While 
improved pedestrian, bicycle and automobile access to the Gold Line (serving San Gabriel 
Valley and East Los Angeles) was allotted $30 million and top priority in the long range 
plan, Gold Line extensions were not to begin construction until after the completion of a 
new rail line on the West Side – the Exposition Blvd. Light Rail.
Extensive stakeholder participation in development of package é
This case featured an expansive and robust coalition of stakeholders and supporters from 
inception of the package to passage of the measure. The presence of numerous pro-
environment, pro-labor, anti-traffic constituencies in a large, predominately left-of-center, 
metropolitan area was both a benefit and challenge to pro-transit organizers and Metro’s 
long-term transportation plan development teams.
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As previously noted, the majority transportation projects constructing the skeleton of 
the package were delineated in SB 314. Metro worked with stakeholders such as AAA, 
labor union leaders, and business and environmental leaders to come to a construction 
priority and funding scheme each interest would endorse while simultaneously striving 
for geographic balance. Metro Board Member Richard Katz was the point person in 
negotiations with Los Angeles area politicians in incorporating pet projects and gaining 
endorsements.76 All of this made for a delicate balancing act to the end of securing the 
required supermajority of the popular vote.
Transit Environment
In terms of population, Los Angeles is the second largest U.S. city after New York City. 
3,833,995 people reside in Los Angeles proper, creating a population density of 8,205/sq 
mi. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates L.A. County’s July 2008 population to have been 
9,862,049, but Texas Transportation Institute estimates the urban area population to have 
been upwards of 12,800,000.77 Population density is significantly lower beyond the central/
downtown area, where Metro’s headquarters and the majority of public transit are located.
Los Angeles is synonymous with traffic congestion and automobile generated air pollution 
in the American psyche. According to statistics published by the Texas Transportation 
Institute, Los Angeles had ranked first in nearly all measurable congestion categories 
since TTI began compiling statistics in 1982.78 Actuated left turn arrows and protected 
left turn pockets are generally only found in newer developments and heavily travelled 
areas of downtown and West Los Angeles. At any given time, odds are at least one Los 
Angeles freeway is under construction. Partially due to the high-density auto travel and 
poor planning, the city is not particularly bicycle or pedestrian friendly.79
A basic understanding of the existing transit system is necessary in order to grasp the 
potential impact posed by Measure R. Los Angeles County features an extensive bus, BRT, 
light rail, and heavy rail subway system. Metro is the primary transit provider for the City 
of Los Angeles, whereas the City Department of Transportation provides separate service 
to outlying areas. Metro assigns colors to rail and BRT fixed guideways, and operates 191 
bus routes. Metro system wide ridership estimates for August 2008 put average weekday 
boardings at 1,551,459.
Heavy Rail
Two heavy rail subway lines currently run under downtown Los Angeles. The Red Line 
connects central LA to North Hollywood, and the Purple Line connects downtown to 
westward Koreatown via Wilshire Blvd., the beginning of the “Subway to the Sea.” (Note: 
greater Southern California heavy rail system Metrolink is operated by Amtrak.)
Light Rail
Two light rail lines, the Gold Line, (which diverges to serve East Los Angeles and South 
Pasadena), and the Blue Line (which connects the financial district to downtown Long 
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Beach), originate downtown. Measure R projects include a Connector Line to link these 
two light rail lines to the to the Red and Purple heavy rail lines.
The Green Line serves southwest Los Angeles, including Los Angeles International Airport, 
but does not funnel into downtown, only intersecting the Blue Line at the time of this vote.
Bus Rapid Transit
MetroLiner is the designation of Bus Rapid Transit services in Los Angeles County. At 
the time of the development of this package, the Orange Line (a westward extension of 
the northern Red Line) was in operation and the Silver Line (a separate corridor between 
downtown and northeastern San Gabriel Valley) was in the planning stage. Measure R 
projects include funds for expansion of BRT services in the San Gabriel Valley.
Other Bus Services
Metro operates 191 bus routes with varying travel time schemes and number designation 
based on geographic location and service level. It also transfers to neighboring bus 
operators such as Big Blue Bus in Santa Monica. Interestingly, 20 percent of Measure 
R funds are allotted for bus operations and Metro estimates August 2008 bus system 
boardings at 1,227,211 daily, or 79.1 percent of all system riders. (The latter figure applies 
only to the Metro system, and excludes the many other transit operators, including the 
Metrolink commuter system, that provide service in the region.)
Lack of problems with existing transit system é
Any shortcomings notwithstanding, L.A. Metro was recognized as America’s Best Transit 
System by the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) in 2006. Decals 
advertising this fact were featured in every Metro-operated vessel. Partially due to 
pressure from social justice advocacy group the Bus Riders’ Union, thousands of buses 
were added to the fleet between 1996 and 2005, allowing high-demand routes to feature 
service every 12 minutes and increasing access to jobs, schools and medical services. 
Buses embrace new technologies; almost all new vessels run on natural gas and some 
incorporate sensors alerting street lights of their approach. Perhaps the greatest single 
problem with this system is that it is in Los Angeles, where measures to improve timeliness 
are limited by an environment of overbearing congestion.
Congestion “crisis” é
The average automobile-driving Los Angeleno will spend copious amounts of time in halted 
traffic. Typical rush hours range from 5 a.m. to 11 a.m. and 2 p.m. to 9 p.m., but traffic 
jams occur at any time. A recent analysis of national data ranked the Hollywood Freeway 
(Hwy. 101 through downtown Los Angeles) as the worst commute in the country, with 
an estimated 77 weekly hours of congestion at the worst bottleneck.80 The Los Angeles 
urban area in 2007 boasted a Travel Time Index of 1.49 (Chicago was second place at 
1.43), total annual delay of 485,022,000 person-hours, and annual congestion cost of 
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$10,328,000,000.81 In the case of Los Angeles, the term “crisis” may fail to convey the 
gravity of the congestion problem, both real and perceived.
Recent initiative experience ê
Neighboring Orange County renewed its ½ cent sales tax for transportation-centered 
Measure M in 2006, but the possible carryover experience or attitudes born of this action 
are beyond the scope of this analysis. Los Angeles County had twice before voted to raise 
the sales tax rate by a ½ cent: Proposition A in 1980 and (auxiliary) Proposition C in 1990. 
These taxes continue to generate revenue and partially fund Metro transit operations and 
recent capital projects. Los Angeles area interviewees spoke to the willingness of residents 
to continuously embrace new transit capacity in search of congestion relief, but an 18-year 
gap since the passage of the last transportation ballot initiative cannot qualify as “recent 
initiative experience” for the purposes of this analysis.
The Campaign
Former Santa Monica Mayor Denny Zane had independently chartered a “Subway to 
the Sea” coalition after Mayor Villaraigosa announced his intention to bring rail to the 
West Side, but this group disbanded upon realization that funds were not to immediately 
materialize for any such project. Notwithstanding, news articles and documentary material 
from the time indicate that Zane was a key player in bringing about Measure R, and he 
was directly contacted for information regarding his involvement in bringing the initiative 
to fruition.
Zane was closely allied with organized labor, having worked with the County Federation 
of Labor on a living wage while Mayor of Santa Monica. He was also connected to Dan 
Rosenfeld, chair of LA Chamber of Commerce’s Transportation and Land Use Committee, 
from their mutual work on Third Street Promenade in Santa Monica.
In November 2007, Zane formed “Move LA,” an organization dedicated to coalition 
building for a long-range transit plan. He and his associate Terry O’Day (executive director 
of Environment Now) were able to call a meeting of over 40 executives from organizations 
such as the Los Angeles Business Council, the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor 
(AFL-CIO), the Central City Association of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Building & 
Construction Trades Council (AFL-CIO), Ironworkers, the Coalition for Clean Air, and 
many others. All agreed that a long-range transportation plan would be beneficial to their 
constituencies, and to work in partnership with Metro in developing and promoting a 
balanced, comprehensive package. A central point of communication came in January 
2008, in which Zane facilitated a conference of over 350 representatives of organized 
interests to hear from Villaraigosa and other Metro officials about the need of coalition 
support for what would become Measure R. In effect, Move LA acted as an ombudsman 
between Metro and organized interests, particularly organized labor and environmental 
groups, over the course of summer 2008.
As previously stated, the state legislature was sluggish in passing accompanying legislation 
to allow the tax increase. Some factions of Metro and Move LA were under the mistaken 
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belief that the legislature needed to approve the measure being placed on the November 
ballot, when in reality the legislature only needed to approve the collection of the tax upon 
passage. This confusion led to a shorter than desired Measure R specific campaign period 
in the face of a slowing economy. After Metro funded a public information campaign that 
upset East Los Angeles representatives of the Metro board in September 2008, Mayor 
Villaraigosa hired his election campaign manager to run a private campaign in favor of 
Measure R in conjuncture with the efforts of Move LA. Villaraigosa himself is estimated to 
have helped raise 80 percent of funds.82 The official campaign lasted six weeks.
Sponsorship by the business community é
Measure R was extremely popular with the Los Angeles business community and organized 
labor. Acknowledging the number of construction jobs that Measure R will create, Laborers 
International Union of North America contributed $200,000 to the campaign. Even the 
Los Angeles County Museum of Art (LACMA) contributed $900,000. LACMA is located 
on Wilshire Blvd. and proposals for the ‘Subway to the Sea’ (the Purple Line extension) 
include a stop adjacent to LACMA.83
Sponsorship by key elected officials é
In addition to comprising a legacy project of Villaraigosa, Measure R won the endorsement 
of Santa Monica Mayor Pam O’Connor. Coupled with the fact that West Los Angeles 
Assemblyman Mike Feuer defended the accompanying Assembly bill and actively 
campaigned in the community,84 the endorsement of the mayor of Santa Monica augmented 
opposition beliefs that this package would be most beneficial to the West Side.
Outside of Villaraigosa’s appointees, the Metro Board of Directors consists entirely of elected 
officials: City Council members and Mayors of neighboring jurisdictions and Los Angeles 
County Supervisors make up the remainder. Particularly active in favor of Measure R 
were Los Angeles County Supervisors Michael Antonovich (representing the northernmost 
supervisory district) and Zev Yaroslavsky (representing the northwest supervisory district 
extending to Santa Monica).
Total fundraising (near $1 million?) é
With respect to the funds for the campaign per se, there was significant business support 
for Measure R. In addition to the munificent donation by LACMA, the Measure R campaign 
included the following contributions:85
• Carpenters-Contractors Cooperation Committee: $125,000.
• Paul Haaga (vice chairman of Capital Research and Management Company): 
$100,000.
• AECOM (transportation engineering services firm): $100,000.
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• Anschutz Entertainment Group (owners of Staples Center, Nokia Theater and LA 
Live in downtown): $100,000.
• Edith Wasserman (widow of the head of Universal Pictures): $100,000.
• Former Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan: $100,000.
• Parsons Brinckerhoff Americas, Inc. (transportation engineering firm): $50,000.
• International Union of Painters and Allied Trades: $50,000.
• International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 47: $25,000.
• Southern California District Council of Laborers: $25,000.
• AT&T California Employee Political Action Committee: $25,000.
News reports from late October 2008 indicate that well above $3 million was raised for the 
Measure R campaign. Combined Metro expenditures and campaign fundraising therefore 
greatly exceed the $1 million threshold of influence.
Support from environmental groups é
Mainstream environmental groups uniformly endorsed Measure R. The Sierra Club was 
among the organizations represented in the early coalition meetings, and a conference 
coordinator is executive director of Environment Now. Some smaller social justice focus 
environmental groups based in East Los Angeles were persuaded by opposition arguments, 
but took no action against the measure.
Consultants with initiative experience é
The consultant Mayor Villaraigosa brought in to lead the Measure R campaign was also 
the mastermind behind Villaraigosa’s insurgent victory in 2005: nationally renowned 
Democratic strategist Ace Smith. Once deemed “legendary” by the New York Times 
because of his many electoral victories on behalf of a range of clients, Smith’s primary 
claim to fame with respect to initiatives was serving as campaign manager for “No on 67,” 
a statewide initiative that lost by a huge margin.86
During a stint as executive director of the Clean Air Coalition in the early 1990s, Denny 
Zane had worked with Metro to begin the transition to a natural gas bus fleet. He had also 
previously managed successful bond campaigns for Santa Monica College, worked with 
City of Los Angeles planners in developing Third Street Promenade (the famous outdoor 
mall), and worked with the County Federation of Labor on a living wage policy while Mayor 
of Santa Monica. In an open letter dated December 2009, Metro Board member Richard 
Katz wrote to Zane:
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I want to thank you very, very much for the exceptional leadership you and your 
organization, Move LA, have shown these past two years. Measure R would not 
have happened without your vision and ability to build a support constituency of 
labor, environmental, and business groups.
Your hard work proved to be the essential cornerstone that enabled us to garner 
support from our elected leaders, to move forward with Measure R and was crucial 
to its success.87
In brief, the Measure R campaign featured extremely talented and experienced leadership 
and advice from a firm grounding in Los Angeles (and greater California) politics.
Use of media é
The Metro-run public information effort consisted of one mass distributed direct mail 
piece. The glossy, full-color leaflet came under the scrutiny of Metro Board members 
representing East Los Angeles and San Gabriel Valley, who claimed it was an advertorial. 
Certain persons within Metro felt that the direct mailer was not informational enough.88 
Because Metro is an entity in partnership with the city of Los Angeles, it could not legally 
run advertisements directly in favor of Measure R. This facilitated the transfer of leadership 
to Villaraigosa’s private campaign manager. Due to the enormous fundraising effort, the 
pro-Measure R campaign was able to run prime time television and radio spots in the 
weeks leading up to the vote.89
According to the Chief Communications Officer of LA Metro, Measure R gained the 
endorsement of five of the seven major Los Angeles area newspapers. The most prominent 
endorsement came from the Los Angeles Times on October 9, 2008. However, the Times 
also allotted column inches to arguments from opposition groups, perhaps lending more 
credibility to its endorsement.
Additionally, Metro maintained a state-of-the-art online presence of information similar to 
that distributed in the direct mail piece. This site also featured a link to the Measure R 
expenditure plan that yielded in excess of 14,000 individual downloads prior to the vote.90
Unorganized, poorly funded opposition é
The most vocal opposition to Measure R came from the BRU, a social justice advocacy 
group. The BRU purports to represent the interests of bus riders throughout Los Angeles 
County, although the majority of bus riders in Los Angeles are probably located from 
downtown eastward, in accordance with the city’s socioeconomic geography.
However, as BRU enjoys non-profit status and receives governmental matching funds, it 
could not directly campaign against Measure R. The leaders of BRU relied on free media 
outlets such as the Los Angeles Times op-ed section to feature BRU-submitted facts and 
historical arguments against. It also maintained a web presence detailing the potential 
threats posed by Measure R.
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The BRU had previously pursued legal recourse against Metro and gained a ten-year 
consent decree over ruled violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.91 BRU legal 
representatives were able to successfully argue that Proposition A and Proposition C 
funds were being spent disproportionately on suburban rail, disproportionately benefitting 
affluent, white Angelinos, and that proposed fare increases and eliminations of monthly 
passes would disproportionately harm minorities. The decree was not extended in 2006, 
clearing the way for Measure R.92 With this history in mind, as a preemptively pacifying 
maneuver, Metro increased the percentage of funds devoted to bus operations and capital 
in this package as compared to previous ones.
Keeping the focus on Measure R as being anti-social justice, anti-civil rights, BRU leaders 
attempted to forge a coalition with leaders of the concurrent “No H8” (No Hate) campaign 
against the ban on gay marriage in California, but to limited success. Their version of a 
public information campaign consisted largely of aforementioned utilization of free media 
and some paper distribution and personal contact. Their lead organizers debated Denny 
Zane in a public forum held in Santa Monica. Esperanza Martinez, a lead organizer, had 
this to share in describing the event, “West Los Angeles crowds didn’t see the social 
justice aspect – they wanted their subway.”93
Without the legal ability to fund a proper opposition campaign or a coalition of significant 
scale to counter the titanic pro-Measure R forces, the opposition in this case was poorly 
funded and organized in the context of this study. 
Congressional or presidential election é
This vote took place simultaneous to the November 2008 election of Barack Obama. From 
the conception phases in 2007 forward, all pro-transit parties involved assumed that this 
election would render high turnout among Democrats and progressives. Measure R was 
intentionally slotted for the 2008 ballot in an attempt to capitalize on this anticipated turnout 
of (theoretically) sympathetic voters.
Summation of Factors
The success of the Los Angeles’s Measure R featured a substantial replication of the 
positive factors from the 2001 study, including:
• Multimodal proposal
• Highway funding
• Extension of existing rail system
• Benefits distributed throughout area
• Extensive stakeholder participation in development of package
• Lack of problems with existing transit system
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• Congestion “crisis”
• Sponsorship by key elected officials
• Sponsorship by the business community
• Support from environmental groups
• Consultant with initiative experience
• Use of media
• Congressional or presidential election
• Total fundraising (near $1 million?)
• Unorganized, poorly funded opposition
The following factors, which were associated with success in the earlier research, were 
not in effect for this election:
• The ½ cent tax increase is not subject to a sunset provision of 20 years or less
• Los Angeles County had not experienced a transit initiative in the recent past
This yields a total of 15 replications of the apparent effect of factors from the previous 
study, and two anomalous conditions.
Evaluation
Los Angeles is the most vast site in the current study in every sense: it is the largest county 
studied, with the largest congestion problem, with the largest existing transit system, and 
the largest ballot proposal in terms of both dollars and projects. Therefore it is perhaps 
appropriate that this complex set of circumstances cast the biggest players. Without the 
vision and direction of key elected officials, primarily Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, and 
progressive leaders, primarily Denny Zane, this measure may not have made it to the 
2008 ballot. In the words of Zane, “Someone had to say ‘let's go.’”
The utilization of experienced consultant Ace Smith and the millions of dollars that flowed 
into the efforts he managed were unmatchable in an area desperate for congestion relief. 
This package met some resistance along geographic and socioeconomic lines and petty 
personal differences between politicians, but was ultimately deemed to be well-enough 
balanced, and supported by 67.93 percent of Los Angeles County Voters. Despite the 
many advantages held by supporters, their margin of victory was less than 2 percentage 
points, due to the supermajority requirement.
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CASE STUDY 6: KANSAS CITY: DEFEAT FOR A NEW, RAIL-ONLY SYSTEM
Introduction
On November 4, 2008, voters in Kansas City voted overwhelmingly against a tax that would 
have funded the creation of a new light rail system. Only 44 percent of voters favored the 
proposal for a 14-mile light-rail system that included a ⅜ cent sales tax increase that would 
have generated an estimated $815 million.
The vote marked the eighth light rail tax election in Kansas City since 1998; in seven 
of those elections, voters rejected the tax proposal. However, in 2006 the city passed a 
proposal that was placed on the ballot primarily through the efforts of local activist and 
rail advocate, Clay Chastain; several of the other previous failures were also initiated by 
Chastain. Chastain’s 2006 voter-approved proposal entailed a 27-mile light rail system that 
was quickly repealed by the city on the basis of excessive cost and other impracticalities 
(including a proposed gondola system). Mindful of the citizenry’s apparent support for 
a light rail system, the city then promised that it would create a more workable plan for 
approval by the voters. With the support inherent in the recent victory for an ambitious 
transit proposal and a ballot accompanying presidential election with relatively high support 
for urban residents, victory seemed all but assured.
The Transit Package
The proposal was to create a 14-mile “starter” light-rail system. The single route funded 
by the package would have extended from Interstate 29 south through downtown Kansas 
City, and would have linked several urban “activity centers,” such as the River Market, the 
Crown Center, and Country Club Plaza, the latter located three miles south of downtown 
and one of the first shopping centers in the United States. The city planned to receive about 
half of the project’s total cost from the federal government, with construction beginning in 
2012 or 2013.
Multimodal proposal ê
The proposal was strictly limited to design and construction of a 14-mile light rail system, 
although proponents did make the claim that the system would “integrate with bicycling and 
walking to create a seamless transportation system, even including a new bike/pedestrian 
path on the planned light rail bridge over the Missouri River.”94
Highway funding ê
No highway funding was included in the proposal.
Benefits distributed throughout area ê
Because the proposal was limited to a single route, it was difficult for proponents to portray 
it as creating a project that would quickly bring tangible benefits to the entire metropolitan 
area, although North Kansas City was also voting for a ½ cent sales tax increase for light 
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rail, in hopes that the Kansas City system would originate there. The general direction, 
along with beginning and end points were established, but the plan lacked a specific route, 
which allowed opponents to allege that the plan wasn’t really thought through. In fact, the 
transit agency staff was still examining which downtown street would carry the line. Thus, 
although proponents sought to portray the project as a key step toward a regional system 
that would enhance the entire metropolitan area, they really could not point to specific 
benefits beyond those afforded by the single line in the near term.
Ultimately, this may have proven to be one of the more damaging aspects of the proposal, 
as Kansas City spreads into four different counties, with a relatively small urban core that 
the proposed, single light rail line would have served.
Sunset provision of 20 years or less ê
The proposal would have been in effect for 25 years.
Extension of existing rail system ê
The project would have created the initial route of an entirely new light-rail system. This, in 
fact, became a significant sore point for supporters. As noted earlier, voters had approved 
of a much more ambitious system in 2006, but city leaders (spearheaded by the Kansas 
City mayor) found common ground only in a much more limited proposal. Later, opponents 
would use the apparent support for a much more ambitious plan against the much more 
modest “starter system” called for by the ballot language. In effect, the opposition was able 
to corral erstwhile supporters of rail development to join them.
Extensive stakeholder participation in development of package ê
The plan – relatively modest and straightforward as it was – was developed by the city. A 
regional steering committee that consisted of Kansas City Mayor Mark Funkhouser and 
other mayors as well as county officials met during the spring and summer of 2008. Despite 
Funkhouser’s stated goal of the creation of a larger, regional rail system, this group could 
not agree to prepare an acceptable plan in time for the November election.
Because this starter line was a very modest initial step toward creation of a more extensive 
system, there was little room (or time) for an extended discussion with stakeholders or the 
public, once the decision was made to move forward. Additionally, the public had already 
voted to approve a more elaborate system, so there was certainly reason to believe that 
a more modest system might also meet with approval. Moreover, the electorate had 
considered six other rail proposals in the decade preceding the November 4, 2008 ballot.
Transit Environment
Lack of problems with existing transit system é
Kansas City’s existing transit system, almost exclusively bus service, is a relatively low-
volume operation. In 2009, for example, a total of approximately 1.7 million trips were 
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taken system-wide, compared to the St. Louis metropolitan total of 5.6 million. The system 
therefore lacks a high profile and has not typically been the subject of great acclaim or 
controversy. Moreover, city voters had approved the renewal of a ⅜ cent sales tax for 
the bus system earlier in 2008, so there is little reason to believe that the existing transit 
system was viewed with disfavor.
Congestion “crisis” ê
Supporters tried to make the case that of the 27 metropolitan areas larger than Kansas City, 
only three (Detroit, Cincinnati, and Orlando) do not have rail transit).95 They cited studies 
that stated that Kansas City’s labor force loses approximately $570 million in productivity 
while waiting in traffic and that rush hour congestion had more than tripled between 1983 
and 2003.96
However, in comparison to other metropolitan areas, the Kansas City metropolitan area 
is not characterized by extreme amounts of traffic or congestion. Although ranked 29th in 
population, the area ranks in the 70th for measures such as delay per peak traveler and 
80th in total travel time.97 So although Kansas City almost certainly experiences some 
negative consequences of from its reliance on the automobile, its current traffic levels 
probably did not connote a “congestion crisis” to most residents as defined in this study.
Recent initiative experience ê
In some ways, Kansas City has had more collective experience with transit tax initiatives than 
virtually any other community. As stated earlier, the city had voted on a spate of proposals 
over the decade preceding the 2008 campaign. However, most of these proposals, along 
with being failures, were in essence sponsored by the same self-directed individual and 
therefore lacked official imprimatur as well as professional campaign mechanisms. So city 
and transit agency staff themselves had little experience with mounting such a campaign, 
despite the recent success of a much more costly plan at the polls in 2006.
The Campaign
The campaign for the light rail proposal was led by attorney Pat McLarney, with Kansas 
City Mayor Mark Funkhouser’s avid support. A primary argument leveled by supporters 
was that the light rail system would be a bargain, because: (a) around 40 percent of the 
sales tax increase burden would fall on visitors; (b) 25 percent would be recovered via light 
rail fares; and (c) the federal government would come through with subsidies to cover up 
to one half of the remaining cost. Supporters also appealed to civic pride, suggesting that 
most other cities now had light rail systems, and that Kansas City was losing a competition 
for modern transit. Initially, the high price of gasoline was a selling point as well, which 
became less effective as the price of gasoline nosedived during the ongoing economic 
crisis.
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Sponsorship by the business community ê
Generally, key business groups in Kansas City seemed to favor the proposal; one 
major victory for the plan was an endorsement by the Greater Kansas City Chamber of 
Commerce – its first expression of support for a light rail proposal after opposing several. 
Several law firms with downtown offices as well as Downtown Council of Kansas City 
also expressed support. However, several other key business and civic groups failed to 
rally behind the proposal. Additionally, some members of the Chamber seemed to voice 
reservations about the long-term costs of the proposal. Moreover, the business community 
failed to come forth with the kind of financial support that signals a real commitment to 
such a proposal and interviewees from the proponent’s campaign signaled frustration over 
the lack of meaningful support.
Sponsorship by key elected officials é
Mayor Mark Funkhouser was the single outstanding and outspoken champion of the 
light rail proposal among elected officials. Although he had consistently favored a more 
ambitious regional transportation plan, he also threw his adamant support in favor of the 
starter project. (His previous opposition to the starter project concept, even though it was 
in the context of seeking a grander project, became fuel for the opposition, however.)
Total fundraising (near $1 million?) ê
Total fundraising for the supporters campaign was much less than the $1 million 
benchmark, closer to $500,000.98 Citizens for Light Rail, the proposal’s campaign arm 
reported receiving approximately $300,000 in donations. Reportedly, approximately one-
fifth of that total came from downtown law firms that presumably stood to benefit from the 
proximity of the proposed initial line.99
Support from environmental groups é
Major environmental groups supported the proposal, although their contribution did not 
comprise substantive contributions to the campaign effort beyond their endorsements.100
Consultant with initiative experience ó
The primary consultant for the campaign was Pat Gray, a local campaign specialist with 
a track record in getting candidates elected, but relatively little experience, if any, with 
tax campaigns. Additionally, supporters hired “Zata3,” a “Democratic-leaning” Washington, 
DC firm that emphasizes direct contact with voters (over mass media), including text 
messaging. However efficacious such tactics may be, they are essentially untested in the 
context of a transportation tax initiative.
Use of media ê
The supporters’ campaign emphasized a low-key approach that downplayed use of major 
media outlets. Instead, their efforts were focused on neighborhood meetings, the Internet, 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
65
II. Case Studies
including social media such as Facebook, and direct mail. The campaign also relied upon 
email and text messages. However, the bulk of the supporters’ war chest was apparently 
directed toward direct mail. Said campaign director Pat McLarney, “Frankly, we spent a 
lot more of our money on direct mail, which has significant information that goes to every 
household in the city. We feel like we can get the full message out a lot better than we 
can on 30-second sound bites on the TV.”101 However, the campaign lacked a high-profile 
major media presence is associated with the presence of this factor.
Unorganized, poorly funded opposition ó
Some opposition did arise with respect to the light-rail proposal. A group called “Citizens 
for Sensible Transit” (also known as “Citizens for Responsible Spending”) raised roughly 
$150,000, primarily from small business owners, some with ties to the automobile 
industry writ large. Donations came from a car-wash owner, a road builder, and a “media 
placement” specialist. The last apparently helped pay for the placement of “flashy” anti-
light rail billboards across the city.102
The opposition centered its message on a theme of uncertainty, suggesting that “too many 
unresolved details about the plan remained.”103 It also unsuccessfully sought to stop the 
election in court, contending that the city had not followed proper legal procedure when 
it enacted the ordinance that put the light rail proposal on the ballot. Beyond free press 
coverage from an otherwise generally supportive local media, the opposition group had 
little chance to affect the outcome of the election.
The opposition’s success therefore followed a not unprecedented pattern of exploiting a 
news vacuum about such a proposal. Said a frustrated supporter, “The opposition can just 
pick out [words] like ‘experiment, ‘a billion dollars’ and a few words on a negative side and 
get that message out. It’s hard to do it on a positive side.”104 Had supporters been able to 
raise more funds, the type and amount of organized opposition to the project might have 
been insufficient to forestall a positive outcome.
Congressional or presidential election
The November ballot coincided with the presidential election. Turnout for the election was 
indeed high (66.7 percent). However, approximately 10,000 fewer individuals completed 
their ballot for the light rail question than for the presidential choice, indicating some drop-
off in voter interest and/or stamina. Because the measure lost by more than 10,000 votes, 
this fact did not really affect the outcome, but it does suggest that the measure was not 
paramount in voters’ minds, despite the high turnout.
Evaluation
“Too many things broke against us,” said Kansas City lawyer Pat McLarney, a leader of the 
campaign supporting light rail.”105 Supporters tended to blame the economic downturn for 
the rapid reversal of support for a light rail tax between 2006 and 2008. Only 44 percent of 
voters backed the ⅜ cent sales tax for a 14-mile light-rail line.
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In terms of the expectations associated with the factors used in this report, the initiative 
was ill-fated. The Kansas City campaign was saddled with at least nine factors that 
associated with losing efforts (lack of a multi-modal proposal, lack of highway funding, lack 
of widespread benefit from proposal, sunset provision over 20 years, lack of a congestions 
“crisis,” lack of recent initiative experience, lack of fundraising over $1 million, lack of a 
mixed media campaign), and only four clearly positive ones (support from key elected 
official, lack of problems with existing system, support from environmental groups, lack 
of organized opposition, general election). Ambiguous or inconclusive factors, such as, 
use of a consultant with imitative campaign experience, and sponsorship by the business 
community did not seem to auger well for the outcome either.
In retrospect, the opposition was not particularly well-funded or organized, but relative to 
the amount of financial and organizational support that the measure received, it was quite 
effective. The small scale of the project may also have helped to doom it, as this aspect of 
the proposal created ripples among several factors (lack of a multi-modal proposal, lack of 
highway funding, lack of widespread benefits from proposal). It is likely that relatively few 
voters saw any specific benefit to themselves or their community from this scaled-back 
proposal.
CASE STUDY 7: ST. LOUIS COUNTY – ANOTHER DEFEAT FOR METROLINK
Introduction
In November of 2008, St. Louis County voters narrowly defeated Proposition M, a ½ cent 
sales tax that would have supported public transit operations and infrastructure, including 
the region’s light rail system, known as “MetroLink.” Proposition M would have raised an 
estimated $80 million a year for a system that faced a $45 million deficit, and in doing so 
might have provided stability for the foreseeable future. However, the campaign to pass 
Proposition M failed, as opposing voters edged supporters by 51.5 to 48.5 percent. Had 
merely 8,000 voters out of the 509,000 total supported the measure, the outcome would 
have changed in favor of Proposition M.
The St. Louis area was also featured in the 2001 MTI report, which also chronicled a 
losing effort. In 1997, voters rejected a ¼ cent sales tax increase that would have primarily 
funded additional lines for the existing MetroLink system by a 58 percent to 42 percent 
margin. One of the primary factors that seemed to doom that initiative was controversy 
over the plans for a routing of an additional MetroLink line that had already been approved 
for funding.106 This was one of the cases from the 2001 study that helped build the case 
for “Lack of problems with existing transit system” as a potentially critical factor in helping 
passage of transit tax initiatives.
The Transit Package
Proposition M was planned to inject public transit in the St. Louis area at an estimated rate 
of $80 million per year, with half of that sum to be used to cover a shortfall of operating 
funds at “Metro,” the agency that runs most of the Metrolink system as well as the MetroBus 
service, including demand-driven bus services. Some funds were to go to modernizing the 
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system’s fare collection system. The remainder was to be devoted to future expansion 
of the MetroLink light rail line. However, no specific lines or routes were detailed in the 
Proposition.
The 2008 campaign carried additional significance for area residents, as passage of the 
St. Louis County measure would also have the effect of kick starting a ¼ cent sales tax 
increase in the City of St. Louis that had been passed in 1997, contingent on the county 
tax increase.
Proposition M was would put a shot in the arm for public transportation at an estimated 
rate of $80 million per year, $40 million of which would be used to cover a shortfall of 
operating funds at Metro, with the remainder banked for future expansion of the MetroLink 
light-rail line.
Multimodal proposal é
As the funds raised by this tax increase would have been in part devoted to shoring up 
Metro’s operating deficit, including its MetroBus service, this was at least in theory a 
multimodal proposal. On the other hand, the only new service it would have funded was 
light rail expansion.
Highway funding ê
The proposal contained no funding for highways.
Benefits distributed throughout area é
To the extent that Metrolink and MetroBus serve the entire county, this project could be 
characterized as providing benefits throughout the service area. Improvements in fare 
collection technology would presumably also be system-wide. Additionally, the future 
expansion of the Metrolink system that was to be funded by half of the revenue was not 
specified by area, further expanding the potential for perception, if not the reality of system-
wide benefits. The fact that passage would have activated an additional tax in the City of 
St. Louis further confirms that this measure could be perceived as benefitting a wide area.
Sunset provision of 20 years or less é
The new ½ cent increase was slated to sunset in 20 years.
Extension of existing rail system é
Half of the revenue garnered by the tax was planned to help fund expansion of the MetroLink 
system, although specific routes were not identified in the transit package. The MetroLink 
system was a well-known, even popular public transit option at the time of the election.
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Extensive stakeholder participation in development of package ê
The proposal was prepared largely by County and Metro transit agency officials. As it 
did not call for a creation of a new system, or the detailed systemic expansion of the 
existing one, it is unsurprising that large scale public participation was not a factor in its 
development. Nevertheless, the public did not have significant exposure to or input into the 
transit package that went to the ballot.
Transit Environment
The City of St. Louis – which excludes St. Louis County – is a medium-sized American city 
of approximately 350,000, but the Greater St. Louis Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) is 
the fifteenth largest in the United States, with a population of 2.8 million. Traffic congestion 
is moderate; the Texas Transportation Institute recently ranked the area is only 47th in 
“Annual Delay per Traveler” and 52nd in its “Travel Time Index.”107 (However, the St. Louis 
public transit system is robust and its light rail system is widely regarded as one of the 
more successful new systems in the US.
That said, the Metro system is not without its problems and challenges. As detailed in the 
2001 MTI study, ill-timed squabbling about Metrolink routes seemed to cripple its 1997 tax 
initiative campaign. Similar problems would seem to have helped doom its 2008 effort.
Lack of problems with existing transit system ê
Although Metro has earned a reputation as a reliable system in terms of service provision 
that had improved on-time performance during past five-to-ten years, problems with 
new construction of the MetroLink system arose in the form of cost overruns. As these 
problems threatened to push the agency over budget, the agency leadership opted to sue 
an engineering firm over the overruns. However, Metro lost its case in court and was also 
obliged to pay legal fees for the defendant. These events, along with a cutback in its federal 
operating subsidy had the combined effect of draining the system’s operating budget to 
the brink of bankruptcy. Thus the agency’s public image was at low ebb as Proposition M 
came up for public consideration.
Congestion “crisis” ê
As documented by TTI statistics, traffic congestion in the St. Louis area, while certainly 
not insignificant, is probably not what was at issue in this election. The viability of the 
existing transit system and its future were of more direct importance, although proponents 
of Proposition M certainly attempted to establish a link between possible service cuts and 
increased congestion.
Recent initiative experience ê
Before the 2008 election, the last tax ballot initiative in the County of St. Louis was the 
failed 1997 effort that was detailed in the 2001 MTI study. Therefore, neither policymakers 
nor the public had recently gained experience or familiarity with the process. However, the 
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fact that a similar imitative was passed just two years later (in 2010) would seem to reaffirm 
the potential utility of recent ballot experience. (The latter election is briefly discussed in a 
subsequent section titled Outcomes of Rebound Elections.)
The Campaign
In cooperation with support from the County Executive’s office, Bob Baer, the CEO of 
Metro endeavored to have the St. Louis County Council voted to put Proposition M on the 
ballot for November of 2008. The public campaign was driven by the County Executive’s 
(Charley Dooley) office, while Metro led public education portion of the effort. Additionally, 
a key staffer from the County Executive’s office, Darren Cline, was tasked to the campaign. 
Opposition to the initiative was neither broad-based nor well funded. However, the 
campaign seemed to lack a major selling point, a key public figure to energize its cause, 
and lacked the funding support that many successful efforts boast. One of the campaign’s 
central messages – that failure to pass Proposition M would result in service cuts – was 
essentially negative and, in retrospect, perhaps did not constitute a convincing rallying 
point given the agency’s other problems.
At the same time, what could be characterized as a more grassroots effort was marshaled 
by the Transit Alliance, an amalgamation of more than fifty community-based organizations 
with an interest in the transit system. However, the role of this coalition was neither broad 
nor clear enough to make a decisive impact on the outcome of the election, although it 
did help to raise nearly $100,000 for the campaign. To a certain extent, the efforts of the 
Transit Alliance were not well-coordinated with those of the Proposition M campaign.108
A further problem for the Proposition M campaign was the fact that the issue was going 
before an essentially suburban electorate. Pre-election polling suggested that only 10 
percent of the respondents used the Metro system, and many of those used it to get to 
and from sporting events in downtown St. Louis.
Sponsorship by the business community ê
Although not by any means totally absent, support for the measure from the local business 
community seemed to be lukewarm, as some ambivalence existed towards a tax increase 
seemed to temper enthusiasm and donations for the cause. Major business coalitions 
such as Civic Progress and the Regional Business Council were on board, but perhaps 
less than optimally engaged on a leadership and financial support basis.
Sponsorship by key elected officials ó
St. Louis County lacks a strong elected executive official, so this aspect of the election is 
problematic to evaluate. The County Executive and most of the County Council supported 
the measure strongly, but it is not clear whether the public could associate this measure 
with a well-known, visible elected official.
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Total fundraising (near $1 million?) ê
Due perhaps to the less than enthusiastic support from the local business community, 
the Proposition M campaign raised $700,000 and the Transit Alliance raised an additional 
$100,000 – not a trifling amount, but not close enough the million dollar benchmark 
identified for this factor. The recalcitrance of the business community may have been 
linked to a negative experience with the consultant to a previous campaign. In any event, 
fundraising efforts were deemed less than successful by the supporters of Proposition M.
Support from environmental groups é
The proposal received support from environmentalists, including the Sierra Club, which 
noted the funding measure would help “get more people out of their cars and on alternatives 
like transit to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” and “meet the growing demand for public 
transit service, thereby encouraging more sustainable life styles.”109
Consultant with initiative experience é
The campaign hired a consultant, Rich Slackman (a Democrat from San Francisco with 
extensive experience in local initiative campaigns), although the extent which Schlackman 
had transit-specific tax initiative experience or experience in other St. Louis campaigns is 
unclear.
Use of media ê
Slackman is well-known for his effective use of direct mailing strategies, which were used 
heavily in the Proposition M campaign, but interviewees questioned the effectiveness and 
volume of other media ads. Essentially, the campaign lacked sufficient funding to do an 
adequate amount of on-air campaigning using major media.110
Unorganized, poorly funded opposition é
Although several County Council members opposed the measure (and had voted against 
its inclusion on the ballot), they did not take an active or vocal role once the campaign 
began. Other opposition wasn’t organized or funded to any significant degree.
Evaluation
Given that seven factors associated with passage of transit tax initiatives (highway funding, 
extensive stakeholder participation, lack of problems with transit agency, congestion crisis, 
recent initiative experience, strong business community support) were not satisfied by the 
St. Louis County effort, the negative outcome seems quite consistent with that predicted 
by the model. Five factors (multi-modal proposal, wide distribution of benefits, sunset 
provision, extension of existing system, and lack of organized opposition) mitigated in 
favor of passage, and two were found to be inconclusive (support of key elected official, 
experienced transit election consultant).
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
71
II. Case Studies
Of the negative conditions, the negative public perception of the transit system was deemed 
by interviewees to be one key to the outcome, but other factors were potentially at play as 
well. One might have expected such an initiative to fare well in a county with a large African 
American population in the presidential election of 2008, where Barack Obama won by 20 
percentage points (and by more than 100,000 votes). However, the presidential election 
turned out to be quite possibly a negative factor, as it created such high turnout that some 
precincts had four-hour lines, particularly in African American precincts. Some questioned 
the extent to which the campaign actively courted the African American community. As 
Proposition M was near the bottom of a lengthy slate, nearly 50,000 fewer voters weighed in 
on the ballot measure as voted in the Presidential race. Given the slender margin by which 
it failed, this precipitous voting drop-off may have singlehandedly doomed Proposition M.
Another possible negative factor unique to this case was the presence of two additional tax 
measures on the St. Louis County ballot. Pre-election polling suggested that Proposition 
M would fare poorly if it were in competition with other tax measures. This forecast proved 
valid; the fact that the campaign lacked enough funding to raise awareness above these 
“competing” measures was perhaps an additional and final impediment to its prospects.
CASE STUDY 8: SANTA CLARA COUNTY’S CALCULATIONS –  MEASURE 
B’S ⅛ CENT SUPPLEMENTAL SALES TAX INCREASE (2008)
Introduction
The 2001 MTI study featured Santa Clara County’s improbable passage of Measure A in 
2000, which was a 30-year extension of a ½ cent transit-dedicated sales tax increase set 
to expire in 2006. The 2000 vote featured $6 billion in projects, including the marquee Bay 
Area Rapid Transit (BART) heavy rail extension to San Jose. By 2002, Santa Clara Valley 
Transportation Authority (VTA) – the special district tasked with managing congestion and 
maintaining the county’s roads and transit – was experiencing a budget shortfall and was 
forced to reduce existing bus and light rail services. In 2005, VTA withdrew requests for 
matching federal financing for BART so as to be able to resolve travel demand modeling 
discrepancies, evaluate ridership estimates and address financial capacity issues. Measure 
A “included more than $1 billion in rail operating costs, but according to VTA staff, another 
sales tax to cover operating costs for the life of the tax would probably be needed in 2012 
or 2014.”111 The bursting of the Silicon Valley high tech bubble probably contributed to the 
need for additional revenue sooner than prophesied, prompting Measure B in 2008.
The Transit Package
In 2008, the VTA board proposed a ⅛ cent supplemental sales tax increase to generate 
a dedicated revenue stream sufficient to fulfill the bulk of VTA’s obligation to BART for the 
operation, maintenance and future capital reserve of the system without impacting existing 
and planned service levels for VTA bus and light rail service. On November 4, 2008, 
the tax increase was very narrowly approved with 66.78 percent of the vote, California 
requiring a two-thirds majority. The ballot language of Measure B made collection of 
the tax contingent on assurance of state and federal funds, specifically: receipt of a Full 
Funding Grant Agreement of $750 million from the Federal Transit Administration and an 
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Allocation Request of at least $240 million from the California Transportation Commission 
(or equivalent).
Multimodal proposal ê
Measure B strictly addressed the need for further revenue to finance BART.
Highway funding ê
Corresponding to Measure A in 2000, Measure B contained no funds for highway projects.
Benefits distributed throughout area ó
VTA has traditionally organized itself according to the principle that its routes cover a 
comprehensive geographic area. Year 2000’s Measure A projects sought goals of high 
expected ridership, regional connectivity and socioeconomic balance. Most prominently, 
Measure A sought to connect the east Bay Area to the population center of the south Bay 
Area via the BART rail system. The route is expected to be within a 15-minute automobile 
or public transit trip for 1,007,000 residents.112 However, as this represents just over half 
of Santa Clara County residents and many proposed stations of the BART extension 
are not easily accessible by south and west San Jose residents, this factor is deemed 
inconclusively present.
Sunset provision of 20 years or less ê
The ⅛ cent sales tax increase will be in effect for 30 years once matching funds are 
secured.
Extension of existing rail system é
The original planners of the BART system envisioned heavy rail surrounding the San 
Francisco Bay. The line currently terminates in the Alameda County city of Fremont, not 
extending into Santa Clara County. The BART extension detailed in Measure A and more-
fully financed by Measure B will serve the South Bay cities of Milpitas and Santa Clara and 
populous areas of north, east and downtown San Jose.
Extensive stakeholder participation in development of package ó
As was the case in 2000, Silicon Valley Leadership Group (SVLG, previously known as 
Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group) sparked the coalition building process, beginning 
as early as 2006. The group hosted targeted stakeholder meetings with organizations 
such as the League of Conservation voters, the San Jose Downtown Association and 
the League of Women Voters. Further, it conducted a survey gauging support of SVLG 
member companies, and coordinated communications to key networks throughout the 
campaign. SLVG also conducted polls testing a variety of ballot language.
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Akin to 2000, the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors declined to place the measure 
on the ballot, but the VTA board (consisting largely of San Jose and other local municipality 
council members) consented to do so. As a governmental body, VTA was required to 
conduct public hearings on the proposed BART extension.
While these actions are certainly evidence of some stakeholder participation, given the 
intended dedicated expenditure of this ⅛ cent increase, the process did not feature the 
level of interaction and negotiation indicated by this factor. Yet this measure was built 
upon a series of previous measures that did entail more sweeping participatory measures. 
Thus, this factor is at best inconclusively present in this case.
Transit Environment
Santa Clara County features in excess of 1.7 million residents, with more than 1 million 
located in the city of San Jose. Due to decades of development-friendly land use decisions, 
San Jose is a vast sprawl of over 178 square miles in which many residents live in low-
density suburbs several (if not dozens of) miles from their places of work. High paying 
high tech jobs are typically located in northern San Jose and northern neighboring cities, 
whereas many affluent communities are located in inadequately connected southeast San 
Jose. Car ownership is nearly uniform in the “Capital of Silicon Valley,” and the City of 
San Jose’s focus on transit-oriented development (TOD) and increased connectivity in its 
Envision San Jose 2040 General Plan Update are slow to captivate residents who rely on 
automobiles out of personal convenience and/or necessity. While smart land use planning 
and the concept of regionalism are increasingly gripping leaders throughout the Bay Area 
region, a change in attitudes toward personal use of public transportation has yet to be 
seen among the vast majority of Santa Clara County residents, whose vehicle occupancy 
rates are among the lowest in the nation.
Lack of problems with existing transit system ó
In 2007, VTA received a scathing audit from the consulting firm the Hay Group, including 
charges that the VTA board’s rotation scheme led to ineffectual decision-making and 
that the system was vastly underutilized and its assets mismanaged. In response, VTA 
launched “The New VTA” campaign, which expanded bus service in the highest ridership 
corridors and eliminated routes with low ridership. An August 2008 VTA press release 
showed a 2.6 percent increase in system ridership from a year previously, partially due to 
expansion of the system’s EcoPass partnerships with private businesses, colleges, and 
residential organizations. Though not time tested, a trend of improvement carried into this 
vote.
Congestion “crisis” é
After many improvements to highways and public transit, Santa Clara County remains 
a heavily congested metropolitan area with impacted corridors in nearly all cities. Area 
congestion statistic rankings peaked with the high tech bubble in 2000–2001, at which 
point Travel Time Index, Delay Per Peak Traveler and Cost Per Peak Traveler were 
consistently among the six worst metropolitan areas in the nation. Conditions improved 
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slightly in the early 2000s, but congestion was on the rise once again by the latter half 
of the last decade. In 2007, a Travel Time Index of 1.36 exceeded year 2000 measures 
and Congestion Cost totaled over $1 billion.113 Public opinion surveys – the present day 
economic crisis conditions aside – typically find “traffic congestion” ranking at or near the 
top of residents’ policy concerns.
Recent initiative experience é
In 2006, the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors (in consultation with vested 
stakeholders) placed on the ballot a 30-year ½ cent sales tax increase for general county 
purposes, including healthcare and transportation planning and improvements. While it 
could not legally be expressly stated that the general tax would fund BART, it was understood 
to be a priority project. The general-purpose tax increase required only a simple majority to 
pass, however, it was defeated 43 percent to 57 percent. (For a further discussion of this 
vote see section Rebound Elections.)
The Campaign
The Silicon Valley Leadership Group, led by Carl Guardino, advocated a sales tax increase 
for BART operations and maintenance in 2006, which was collapsed into the failed general-
purpose measure. SLVG approached the VTA board about putting the ⅛ cent supplemental 
increase on the 2008 ballot and ran the “Yes on B” campaign. As a taxpayer funded special 
district, VTA is severely limited in its ability to campaign for measures it supports. A week 
before the election, VTA came under scrutiny for alleged collusion with SVLG after email 
correspondence between the two groups strongly indicated that opinion editorials in favor 
of the measure run in the San Jose Mercury News – the county’s major newspaper – were 
written by VTA staff.114 This legal gaffe and ensuing court challenges notwithstanding, the 
pro-transit coalition backing Yes on B ran an effective, comprehensive series of targeted 
campaigns.
Sponsorship by the business community é
Nearly every member organization of the Silicon Valley Leadership Group and the San 
Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce supported Measure B. The substantial capital 
from these business interests served as a solid fundraising base, and was augmented by 
efforts from the Santa Clara Building & Construction Trades Council and South Bay Labor 
Council as well as individual donations from SVLG and Chamber company executives.
Numerous Silicon Valley CEOs were quoted professing their beliefs that the planned BART 
extension will stimulate economic growth by providing construction jobs and increased 
commercial opportunity along the designated corridor. Many also expressed the desire for 
greater connectivity and transit options for themselves and their employees.
Yes on B consultants indicated that among the most significant proponents of Measure B 
were: Carl Guardino (SVLG), Neil Struthers from the Building Trades Council, and Phaedra 
Ellis-Lamkins from the South Bay Labor Council. Guardino has been a stalwart supporter 
and key player in Santa Clara County’s expansion of public transportation for over 20 
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years. The labor leaders were critical in fundraising, providing volunteers for phone banks 
and precinct walks, and eliciting buy-in of local politicians.
Sponsorship by key elected officials ó
In addition to the VTA board consisting of elected local city council members and county 
supervisors, two visible supporters of Measure B were San Jose Mayor Chuck Reed 
and San Jose City Councilmember Sam Liccardo (the latter representing downtown and 
serving on numerous Bay Area transportation and planning commissions). While Mayor 
Reed allowed his likeness to be featured in mailers for Measure B and was occasionally 
quoted in favor of the extension, he did not explicitly champion the proposal, and his 
political viability was not tied to the measure to the extent seen in other cases studied.
The region’s congressional delegation also lent its support to Measure B. Safely situated 
Congressman Mike Honda (who represents west San Jose and neighboring southwestern 
cities) was also featured in Yes on B direct mail pieces. In terms of targeted geographical 
support in a region not expected to receive many benefits from the proposed line, his 
endorsement may have been important, but again lacks the degree conviction implied by 
this factor.
Total fundraising (near $1 million?) é
The Yes on B campaign raised just over $1,000,000.115
Support from environmental groups ê
The local chapter of the Sierra Club opposed Measure B, but mailers highlighting 
the environmental positives of increased public transit utilization likely mitigated the 
effectiveness of this largely muted opposition.
Consultant with initiative experience é
Three months before the election, SVLG contracted Barry Barnes of TBW&B Public 
Financing Strategies Inc. Barnes had previously worked on transportation campaigns in 
Sonoma County in 2004 and Fresno in 2006, as well as been familiar with the failed 2006 
general purpose tax proposal. His guided passage of Measure M in Sonoma County was 
its first approved countywide transportation package in four attempts.
Use of media é
In addition to editorials in the Mercury News, the Yes on B campaign utilized various forms 
of media in disseminating its pro-transit message. Its most prominent advertising ploy 
came in the form of direct mail targeted to: Republicans, women, independent holdouts, 
seniors and younger voters. Volunteers distributed informational flyers to San José State 
University students highlighting the BART station planned in the vicinity of the campus. The 
Yes on B campaign maintained an extensive website featuring testimonials from transit 
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supporters. The campaign also produced television spots and purchased airtime on cable 
news outlets such as CNN.
While a by-and-large positive campaign, Barnes acknowledged that two direct mail pieces 
were produced specifically to rebut opposition arguments.
Unorganized, poorly funded opposition é
Opposition mounted against Measure B claiming inaccurate ridership statistics and a 
waste of taxpayer funds. Opposition came from the Silicon Valley Taxpayer Association and 
Citizens for Responsible Transit Planning. The No on B camp was somewhat organized, 
also writing editorials in local papers and immediately seeking legal recourse for perceived 
inappropriate interaction between VTA and the Yes on B campaign. However, the 
opposition was only able to raise $40,000, which included a large donation from Cypress 
Semiconductor (the only actively opposing member company of SVLG) and a local car 
salesman. As the group could not afford any form of anti-rail media campaign, it is deemed 
ineffective for purposes of this study.
Congressional or presidential election é
This vote took place on November 4, 2008, simultaneous to the election of Barack Obama. 
While Silicon Valley is predominately Democratic and of progressive ideological orientation, 
the Yes on B campaign did not partner with the extensive network of Obama supporters in 
the region in distributing their pro-transit message.
Summation of Factors
The success of Santa Clara County’s Measure B featured a replication of the following 
positive factors from the 2001 study:
• Extension of existing rail system
• Congestion “crisis”
• Recent initiative experience
• Sponsorship by the business community
• Sponsorship by key elected officials
• Consultant with initiative experience
• Use of media
• Congressional or presidential election
• Total fundraising (near $1 million?)
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
77
II. Case Studies
• Unorganized, poorly funded opposition
The effects of the following factors are inconclusively present:
• Benefits distributed throughout area
• Extensive stakeholder participation in development of package
• Lack of problems with existing transit system
The following factors, which were associated with success in the earlier research, were 
not in effect for this election:
• Multimodal proposal
• Highway funding
• Sunset provision of 20 years or less
• Support from environmental groups
This yields a total of ten replications of the apparent effect of factors from the previous 
study, three inconclusive finding, and four anomalous conditions.
Evaluation
This case study is unique in that the sales tax increase discussed is a supplemental 
increase designed specifically to fulfill the financial obligations of one project detailed in 
a prior transit measure. Notably, the need for this supplemental tax was acknowledged 
at the time of passage of Measure A in 2000. Measure B is also unique in that it features 
a triggering mechanism in the form of assured state and federal matching funds. Yes 
on B campaign organizers contribute the measure’s narrow passage to ballot language 
reassuring citizens that Santa Clara County taxpayers would not be funneling additional 
sales taxes into a non-start project.
The measure passed only by an eyelash, but its success speaks to the effectiveness of 
Silicon Valley business leaders in corralling support amongst key voting populations.
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In this section, the results of the eight elections detailed in this study are summarized with 
respect to the performance of the seventeen factors that were identified in the 2001 MTI 
report as potential predictors. Additionally, the performance of these factors is compared 
with respect to that identified in the 2001 report, in keeping with the goal of seeking 
replication of the earlier findings.
This section begins with a description of the possible limitations of the results presented in 
this report; the case study approach used has serious implications for the degree to which 
the results may be internally and externally valid. Second, the results of all eight elections 
are presented in one table and analyzed with respect both to the performance of each 
factor in (a) “predicting” electoral outcomes overall, and (b) specific elections and types of 
elections. Third, these same results are compared directly with those obtained in the 2001 
study. Finally, because several elections evaluated in the current study were bracketed by 
similar elections in the same communities within a very short time frame, a circumscribed, 
exploratory analysis of the outcomes of such “rebound” elections is presented as well. 
The section concludes with some general observations about the meaning of the results 
obtained for this study.
Caveats on Findings
As it employs the same methods, the current study shares weaknesses in the form of 
potential threats to the validity of its results with the 2001 project:
1.  Possible measurement error and/or bias. Determining whether a given case 
example exemplifies the existence or absence of a given factor is ultimately often a 
primarily subjective endeavor, and in any event, one that lacks extreme precision. 
Although every effort has been made to make unbiased assignations, moreover, 
the predilections or other mistakes of the research team may affect these decisions.
2.  Insufficient number of cases for causal analysis. The number of cases that met 
the stated criteria for selection is not large enough to support statistically robust 
analysis. Therefore the results reported must be regarded as at best suggestive 
of possible predictive and/or causal relationships between the factors analyzed 
and the outcomes of transit tax elections. However, it bears mention that the 
cases in this study do comprise the population of the elections of the size and 
scope of interest during the selected time period and not a sample, meaning that 
a statistically verifiable sample size is not available in any event. Additionally, as 
necessity dictated that fewer cases were available for study in the current study, the 
calculated accuracy of the factors is more sensitive to the outcome a single election.
3.  Although the factors selected for analysis represent conceptually separate 
phenomena, in practice at least some of them may be highly inter-correlated. As 
noted in the 2001 report, for example, the degree to which the business community 
supports a tax proposal may be strongly related to its participation in shaping the 
package, and may affect the amount of money available to fund its campaign, which 
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in turn may affect the ability to mount a mixed-media campaign. This example 
illustrates how at least four factors may be to some immeasurable extent related 
to one another and thus potentially indistinguishable in terms of their impact on the 
outcome of a single election. Thus, caution must be exercised when considering 
the ostensible impact of virtually any single factor as a causal or predictive variable.
4.  Transportation tax elections exhibit idiosyncratic qualities from community to 
community that may generate unique circumstances, which may themselves 
confound the apparent impact of the factors selected here for analysis. As stated in 
the MTI 2001 report:
The need and importance of having a transportation package that includes a 
highway component depend on (a) the current status of the highway system (which 
would influence the priority that voters attach to including highway improvements 
in the package), (b) the degree of impact that environmental groups may have on 
voting behavior if they oppose the measure (which they are likely to do if it has a 
substantial highway component), (c) the degree of importance that environmental 
groups place on beginning or improving a passenger rail system (which would 
influence their willingness to accept a highway component because these groups 
tend to support transit and, more specifically, rail transit), and (d) the extent that 
environmental groups perceive that an immediate solution is needed to improve the 
passenger rail system (which also would influence their willingness to compromise 
and thus support a rail ballot measure with a highway component or with a linked 
ballot measure with a highway component).116
5.  The presence and “behavior” of the selected factors may vary over time, and may 
not be generalizable to future events. However, a major purpose of the current 
study is to determine to what extent factors identified more than ten years ago are 
still associated with election outcomes. So at the very least, these results are useful 
from the perspective of determining the reliability of the 2001 results over time.
In sum, the results of this study ought to be regarded with extreme caution, especially 
with respect to the extent that they may be easily recreated with policy actions in other 
communities under different circumstances. They do, however, provide decision makers 
and others with a basis for comparing the likely associations between specific characteristics 
of transportation tax elections and outcomes in the communities that are the focus here.
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Table 3. Factors Evaluated with Respect to Expected Outcomes
Charlotte  
(repeal)  
2007
Honolulu  
2008 
Santa Clara 
County
2008
Los Angeles 
2008
Maricopa 
County  
2004
St. Louis  
2008
Kansas 
City
2008
Seattle
2007
Fail** Pass*** Pass* Pass* Pass Fail Fail Fail
Multimodal proposal é ê ê é é é ê é
Highway funding ó ê ê é é ê ê é
Benefits distributed throughout 
area é é ó é é é ê é
Sunset provision of 20 years or 
less ê N/A ê ê é é ê ê
Extension of existing rail system ó ê é é é é ê ó
Extensive stakeholder participa-
tion in development of package é ó ó é é ê ê é
Lack of problems with existing 
transit system ê é ó é é ê é ê
Congressional or presidential 
election ê é é é é é é ê
Congestion “crisis” é é é é é ê ê é
Recent initiative experience ê ê é ê ó ê ê é
Sponsorship by the business 
community é é é é é ê ê é
Sponsorship by key elected 
officials é é ó é é ê é ê
Total fundraising (near $1 million?) ê é é é é ê ê é
Support from environmental 
groups é é ê é é é é ê
Consultant with initiative experi-
ence é é é é é é ó é
Use of media é é é é é ó ê é
Unorganized, poorly funded 
opposition ó é é é ê é ó ê
Number of factors replicated 9 11 9 15 15 8 11 6
Number of anomalous factors 5 4 4 2 1 8 4 10
Number of ambiguous conditions 3 2 4 0 1 1 2 1
Notes:
* Required 2/3 vote to pass
** Repeal vote, factors evaluated from perspective of positive transit outcome
*** Affirmation vote of expenditure of Council-mandated increase
Symbols: 
é Condition existed, outcome consistent with expectation
ê Condition absent, outcome consistent with expectation
ó Condition inconclusively or ambiguously present
  Shading indicates anomalous condition, where presence or absence of factor was inconsistent with the expected outcome
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The results from all eight case studies are collated in table 3 according to each of the 17 
factors that were the focus of the analysis. Summed across all elections and factors, the 
results in the table indicate that of a total of 122 valid instances of factors and election 
outcomes (i.e., not inconclusive or ambiguous with respect to the presence of absence of 
a factor), 84 (or 68.9 percent) of the factors were consistent with the expected outcome 
of the elections. Therefore, 38 instances (31.1 percent) were inconsistent with outcome 
of the elections. Overall, this suggests that the factors are reasonably consistent with the 
election outcomes, although these figures exclude a total of 14 inconsistent or ambiguous 
instances. Were such instances included, the consistency of the factors with the electoral 
outcomes would drop to 61.8 percent.
By contrast, the 2001 study identified only 30 anomalous instances out of a total of 155 valid 
cases, with slightly more than 80 percent of the factor/outcome instances matching their 
expected outcomes. This finding suggests a notable degradation of the overall accuracy of 
the selected factors. One election seemed particularly influential with respect to this overall 
pattern. The outcome of the Seattle election created ten anomalies: despite matching 
many factors thought to be associated with electoral success, the Seattle proposal was 
rather easily defeated. The case study method does not enable an easy interpretation 
of this pattern, but it may be that, at least in this case, ongoing problems with the public 
perception of the transit agency meshed with a death of support from key political leaders 
were two factors that could not be overcome by the host of promising conditions.
The factors are noticeably more accurate in the context of successful elections than in 
failing ones. The five successful measures include a total of only 14 anomalous instances, 
or 19 percent of the valid instances, compared to the 23 (48 percent) inconsistencies 
identified in failed ones. This implies that, taken as a whole, the factors identified in this 
research are now more strongly related to success than they are to failure, a fact that 
perhaps dampens their overall utility. The three losing campaigns included the presence of 
several factors that were theorized to be associated with success, whereas relatively few 
of the winning campaigns were characterized by the absence of such factors. For example, 
the losing campaigns in St. Louis and Seattle both featured multimodal proposals that 
benefitted a broad geographical spectrum and were guided by experienced tax initiative 
consultants. One possible interpretation is that these anomalous factors act as necessary 
but not always sufficient forces.
A similar, but much less pronounced pattern is present in the 2001 data; the six successful 
campaigns examined in that study included a rate of 16 percent anomalous instances, 
compared to a 24 percent rate among the four unsuccessful ones. Thus, to a modest 
extent, this pattern in the current data represents replication of the original findings, albeit 
in a manner that seems to undercut the general consistency and utility of the findings.
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Table 4. Accuracy of Individual Factors Compared, 2001 and Current (2011) Study
Factor 2001 2011 Trend in Accuracy
Multimodal proposal 8/989%
4/8
50%
Weaker
Highway funding 6/1060%
4/7
57% About the same
Benefits distributed throughout area 9/1090%
5/7
71% Weaker
Sunset provision of 20 years or less 1/812.5%
3/7
43% Stronger
Lack of problems with existing transit system 10/10100%
5/6
83% About the same
Congressional or presidential election 7/1070%
5/8
63% About the same
Congestion “crisis” 8/989%
7/8
88% About the same
Recent initiative experience 7/1070%
3/7
43% Weaker
Sponsorship by the business community 6/785%
7/8
87% About the same
Sponsorship by key elected officials 9/9100%
7/8
87.5% About the same
Total fundraising (near $1 million?) 8/989%
6/8
75% About the same
Support from environmental groups 5/955%
5/8
63% About the same
Consultant with initiative experience 8/989%
5/7
71% Weaker
Use of media 9/1090%
7/8
88% About the same
Unorganized, poorly funded opposition 7/7100%
4/6
75% Weaker
Note: Ratios refer to number of accurate outcomes out of total number of valid cases, upon which percentages were 
calculated
CONSISTENCY OF INDIVIDUAL FACTORS WITH OUTCOMES
The results presented in table 4 contrast the calculated accuracy of individual factors 
in “predicting” the outcome associated with each in both the 2001 and present studies. 
On the whole, the results in the final column suggest that, despite the overall decline 
in accuracy noted earlier, many of the factors are either about as accurate (i.e., within 
15 percentage points) as they were in the 2001 study with respect to being associated 
with electoral success or failure. More specifically, ten of the factors remained within 15 
percentage points of accuracy (plus two that grew more accurate) and five weakened by 
more than that margin. The following section contains a more detailed examination of the 
results associated with each factor in both the current and 2001 studies. In this context, 
accuracy is associated with the presence or absence of a factor coinciding with expected 
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outcome. Thus, an election wherein a given factor did not exist would be proscribe an 
accurate outcome if the measure failed (and vice versa).
Factors that most closely replicate earlier findings
Highway funding*
The presence of funding for highway in transportation packages was only inconsistently 
associated with passage or failure of tax measures. It was accurate in four of seven cases 
(57 percent), nearly identical to the 60 percent rate estimated in the 2001 study.
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011, weak; 2001, weak.
Benefits distributed throughout area*
A reasonably accurate factor, having benefits of the transportation distributed throughout 
the voting jurisdiction was consistent with the election outcome in five of seven valid cases 
(71 percent). This factor was even more consistently accurate in 2001 (90 percent).
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011, strong; 2001, strong.
Sunset provision of 20 years or less*
The existence or lack of a sunset provision is only weakly associated with electoral 
outcomes; it is accurate in just three of seven valid cases (43 percent). The factor was less 
accurate in predicting outcomes in the 2001 study (12.5 percent), but that is in part due to 
the use 10 years as the cut-off point for existence of the factor in that study. In any event, 
sunset provisions do not appear to be closely linked to the outcome of this kind of election.
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011, weak; 2001, weak.
Congestion “crisis”*
Perhaps the most consistently accurate predictor over the course of the two studies was 
the existence of a perceived or real traffic congestion “crisis.” In both studies’ data, only one 
anomalous valid case was identified, resulting in approximately an 88 percent accuracy 
rate in each. Essentially, locales that can make a strong case for a transportation problem 
are much more likely to succeed than those that cannot, and vice versa.
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011, strong; 2001, strong. 
* Note: Factors marked with an asterisk are those that seemed to most closely replicate the findings in the 2001 study.
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Extensive stakeholder participation in development of package*
As was the case in 2001, extensive stakeholder participation (or lack thereof) was quite 
consistent with the outcome of transit tax elections. Five of valid six cases (83 percent) 
were consistent with the expected outcome; in 2001, 90 percent were consistent.
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011, strong; 2001, strong.
Sponsorship by the business community*
In the data presented in both studies, sponsorship by the local business community seems 
to be critical with respect to electoral success or failure. In both, the factor was consistent 
with electoral outcomes in approximately 85 percent of the valid cases (6/7 in 2001, 7/8 in 
2011).
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011 strong; 2001, strong.
Sponsorship by key elected officials*
Similarly, the data in both studies bear out the consistency of the importance of sponsorship 
by a key official or officials. In the 2011 data, the outcomes six of the seven cases (85 
percent) were consistent with factor; in the 2001, all of the valid cases exhibited the same 
pattern (10/10).
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011 strong; 2001, strong.
Total fundraising (near $1 million?)*
Once again, fundraising is consistently associating with election outcomes. Among the 2011 
cases, the outcomes of six of the eight (75 percent) cases match the presence or absence 
of fundraising at or above the targeted one million dollar total, compared to 89 percent in 
the 2001 study. In the current study, only the results from Seattle and Charlotte counter the 
expectation that raising a million dollars or more will help foster success. In Charlotte, this 
may be explained by the fact that the opposition to transit taxation unexpectedly withered 
in the context of a repeal referendum. The Seattle example is much more complex and 
certainly proves that effective fundraising, especially in the face of organized opposition is 
no panacea for passage.
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011 strong; 2001, strong.
Support from environmental groups*
In both the 2001 and 2011 data, support from environmental groups is only modestly 
associated with success or failure of transportation tax measures. In the 2001 study, 
nearly every campaign boasted support from environmental groups, meaning that failing 
elections also boasted such support. Thus only five of a valid nine cases (58 percent) were 
consistent with the expectation associated with this factor; in the current study, that ratio 
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increases very slightly to five of eight (63 percent). Yet the outcome of the Seattle case 
reminds us that in some circumstances, opposition from environmental groups can be 
associated with electoral failure for tax proposals. Very few campaigns face this challenge, 
so further generalization is difficult to support.
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011 weak; 2001, weak.
Consultant with initiative experience*
The data from both studies is fairly consistent with respect to the outcomes associated 
with having an experienced initiative consultant on board a pro-transit campaign. In 2001, 
the outcome of 89 percent of the cases were consistent with this factor; that percentage 
slipped to 75 percent (six of eight valid cases) in the 2011 cases.
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011 moderate; 2001, strong.
Use of media*
Use of a mixture of campaign was more consistently aligned with transit tax election 
outcomes in 2001, when nine of ten elections (90 percent) were consistent with expectations, 
compared to just six of eight cases (75 percent) in 2011.
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011 moderate; 2001, strong.
Congressional or presidential election*
In both the 2001 and 2011 data, whether an election was held during a major (presidential 
or congressional) election cycle was only moderately linked to the tax measure’s success. 
In the current study, the electoral cycle was an accurate predictor of electoral outcomes in 
five of eight cases (63 percent), compared to a 70 percent rate in the 2001 study. Notably, 
in 2008 neither St. Louis County nor Kansas City found success despite the ostensible 
coattails of the Obama presidential candidacy, although measures in Santa Clara and Los 
Angeles counties were indeed successful, both meeting a ⅔ supermajority requirement.
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011, moderate; 2001, moderate.
Factors that least closely replicate earlier findings
Multimodal proposal
The results presented in table 4 indicate that of eight valid cases analyzed in the current 
study, the presence or absence of a multimodal proposal in the transportation package 
was consistent with the expected outcome of elections only half of the time (4 of 8 cases). 
This 50 percent rate of accuracy is notably weaker than that identified in the 2001 study 
(89 percent, of eight of nine cases). Note that this finding does not necessarily connote 
that multimodal projects are not currently associated with success, but it does suggest that 
they neither guarantee success and nor does their absence guarantee failure.
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Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011, weak; 2001, strong.
Extension of existing rail system
Transportation packages extending to an existing system – or failing to do so – was an 
accurate predictor of four of six valid cases (66 percent). In 2001, it was accurate in only 
half of the cases.
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011, moderate; 2001, weak.
Lack of problems with existing transit system
In 2001, problems or the lack of problems with the existing transit system was extremely 
consistently linked to the expected tax election outcome (in ten of ten valid cases). In 2011, 
this factor was somewhat less consistent with respect to transit tax election outcomes, 
accurate in 71 percent (5/7) of the valid cases.
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011, moderate; 2001, strong.
Recent initiative experience
Possession (or lack) of recent experience with a similar measure was associated with 
the expected outcome in just three of seven valid cases (43 percent), whereas this was 
found to be accurate in 70 percent of ten cases in 2001. This finding, however, needs to 
be evaluated in the light of data presented in the following section on “rebound” elections.
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011, weak; 2001, moderate.
Unorganized, poorly funded opposition
In the 2001 study, all seven valid cases were consistent with the expectation associated 
with this factor. However, in the current study, the outcomes from two cases ran counter 
to a valid prediction, resulting in only four of six valid cases (75 percent) consistent with 
expectations. In Maricopa County, an unexpectedly well-funded opposition (that emanated 
from a single opponent) was crushed with a far better funded supporting campaign; in St. 
Louis, the lack of an organized opposition did not prevent the failure of that community’s 
measure.
Evaluation of fit with election outcomes: 2011 moderate; 2001, strong.
Summary of consistency of individual factors with election outcomes over time
In the current study, several factors seem to be notably less consistent with their expected 
outcomes than in the 2001 study, including: (1) multimodal proposal; (2) benefits distributed 
throughout the area; (3) lack of problems with existing transit system; (4) recent initiative 
experience; and (5) unorganized, poorly funded opposition. However, in nearly all of these 
instances, the factor remained at least moderately consistent with the election outcomes.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
88 III. Findings and Conclusions
Several factors were of relatively little value in terms of their consistency with expected 
electoral outcomes in both studies, including: (1) highway funding; (2) sunset provisions of 
20 years or less; (3) extension of existing rail system; (4) recent initiative experience; and 
(5) support from environmental groups.
Several factors stand out as consistently accurate with respect to “predicting” the outcome of 
local transportation tax elections in both the 2001 and 2011 data: (1) extensive stakeholder 
participation in development of package; (2) congestion “crisis”; (3) sponsorship by the 
business community; (4) sponsorship by key elected officials; and (5) total fundraising (near 
$1 million?), consultant with initiative experience, and use of media all met or exceeded 75 
percent agreement in both studies. These five factors would seem to represent bedrock 
of conditions that are seemingly consistently linked to the success of transportation tax 
initiatives. However, careful perusal of the narratives behind each case yields several key 
exceptions even to these more reliable factors.
OUTCOMES OF “REBOUND” ELECTIONS
A number of the cases included in the current study recount one of a series of two 
transportation tax elections that occurred in quick succession within a given jurisdiction, 
termed “rebound elections.” This section will provide a brief exploratory evaluation of 
factors that appear to have swayed voters between the two elections in each community. 
These findings extend to potential factors outside the 17 emphasized within this study that 
may also be efficacious in the success of ballot measures in similar communities in the 
special context of a brief interlude between elections.
Table 5. Voting Outcomes in “Rebound Elections”
Date of First  
Ballot Measure
Supporting  
Percentage in  
First Ballot  
Measure
Date of  
Second 
 Ballot  
Measure
Supporting  
Percentage in  
Second Ballot  
Measure
Difference in  
Supporting Percentage  
Between Two Ballot 
Measures
Sound Transit District (Seattle) Nov 2007 44.8% Nov 2008 57.1% 12.3%
St. Louis County Nov 2008 48.5% April 2010 62.9% 14.4%
Santa Clara County June 2006 42.9% Nov 2008 66.8% 23.9%
Kansas City Nov 2006 52.9% Nov 2008 45.0% -7.9%
Seattle (Sound Transit District)
• 2007: 44 percent to 56 percent defeat of $18 billion (construction year dollars- $47 
billion with inflation) package for 50 miles of light rail and 186 miles of highway 
construction.
• 2008: 57 percent to 43 percent passage of $13.5 billion (construction year dollars – 
$22.8 billion with inflation), proposal for 36 miles of light rail, additional 100,000 bus 
service hours
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In 2007, well-funded opposition in Seattle successfully attacked a regional history of 
questionable transit financing and piqued concerns regarding environmental impacts 
of roadway expansions. However, these conditions do not obviate the acknowledged 
need for more public transportation as the Sound Transit District population grows and 
congestion worsens.117 Immediately after the failed 2007 measure, Seattle Mayor Greg 
Nickels urged Sound Transit, now free of its legislated obligation to the highway-planning 
Regional Transit Investment District, to return to the ballot in 2008 in an effort to capture 
the expected higher turnout of younger, more liberal voters.118 Sound Transit conducted 
polling that led the organization to believe that a smaller overall package with a smaller 
price tag stood a better chance of passage.119 By July 2008, the package featured the 
buy-in of the Sierra Club and included various regional sweeteners, securing the vote of 
the required number of Sound Transit board members to appear on the November ballot. 
The 2008 measure featured a smaller slate of strictly transit projects, including only those 
expected to reap the greatest return on investment in the near term.
Seattle area interviewees indicated that substantial political support and uniform 
endorsement from environmental groups were key differences between the 2007 and 2008 
campaigns. Rather than actively opposing the package (as it did in 2007) The Sierra Club 
provided 200 volunteers to the “MassTransitNow” campaign in 2008. Seattle Mayor Greg 
Nickels was an ardent supporter of the transit-only package, even suggesting incentives 
for light rail riders.120 He and the MassTransitNow campaign successfully rode the coattails 
of progressive Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama. The pro-transit campaign 
logo, in fact, featured a layout mimicking Obama’s “O” emblem. MassTransitNow worked 
with Democratic precinct captains to distribute pro-transit brochures with pro-Obama 
leaflets.121 This strategy served the dual purpose of being a cost-saving measure for 
the campaign. Transit advocates and opposition forces tacitly agreed to not expend the 
enormous sums of the 2007 campaign in an environment of recessionary circumstances and 
well-established discourse. NoToProp1.org once again sought to advance a catastrophic 
financing scenario and emphasize cost effectiveness of proposals. However, gasoline 
prices of over $4 a gallon appear to have assisted transit advocates in the impact of their 
economic arguments. Proposition 1 (2008) passed 57 percent to 43 percent.
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Table 6. Sound Transit District “Rebound” Factor Analysis
Sound Transit Dist. Prop. 1
(November 2007)
Sound Transit Dist. Prop. 1
(November 2008)
Fail Pass
Multimodal proposal é é
Highway funding é ê
Benefits distributed throughout area é ó*
Sunset provision of 20 years or less ê ê
Extension of existing rail system ó ó
Extensive stakeholder participation in development 
of package
é é
Lack of problems with existing transit system ê ê
Congressional or presidential election ê é
Congestion “crisis” é é
Recent initiative experience é é
Sponsorship by the business community é é
Sponsorship by key elected officials ê é
Total fundraising (near $1 million?) é é
Support from environmental groups ê é
Consultant with initiative experience é é
Use of media é é
Unorganized, poorly funded opposition ê ê
Number of factors replicated 6 11
Number of anomalous factors 10 4
Number of ambiguous conditions 1 2
Note:  
* The sub-area equity rule would still have applied, but fewer residents will reap the benefits of improved access
 
St. Louis County
• 2008: Measure M to fund operations shortfalls and expand light rail services fails 
48.5 percent to 51.5 percent in a general election
• 2009: Metro severely cuts bus services, decreases light rail frequency and slashes 
Call-A-Ride services for disabled
• 2010: Measure A passes in April county election 62.9 percent to 37.1 percent
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St. Louis County’s Metro agency suffered a number of financial difficulties in the years 
leading up to the November 2008 presidential election, resulting in a $45 million deficit. 
Measure M, a ½ cent countywide sales tax increase, sought to meet this operations 
shortfall and fund future (unspecified) extension of Metrolink light rail services.
As discussed in the earlier case study, campaigners in St. Louis did not target messages 
to all affected bus-riding constituencies. The measure sat at the end of a long ballot and 
was marginally defeated.
Without the approximately $40 million Measure M would have funneled into maintaining 
transit service levels, Metro was forced to drastically reduce operations in 2009. The St. 
Louis County Council, mindful of citizen recognition of tangibly declining transit services, 
placed an identical proposal on the April 2010 county election ballot. County Measure A 
was part of a short ballot in an election featuring just a 22 percent turnout.
Addressing shortcomings of 2008, the 2010 Vote Yes campaign, Citizens for Modern 
Transit, and The Transit Alliance, (guided by consultants R&R Partners), embarked on 
a more grassroots effort that focused on activating students and religious leaders. The 
campaign was co-chaired by Mark Wrighton, chancellor of Washington University. The 
university mobilized students and contacted alumni in the area.122 Catholic Archbishop 
Robert J. Carlson endorsed the tax increase, numerous St. Louis Post-Dispatch articles 
referenced citizen inability to travel to church due to service cuts, and African American 
churches were crucial in community organizing and hosting campaign events.
In addition to the continued support of County Executive Charlie Dooley, the Vote Yes 
campaign prominently featured John Nations, the Republican mayor of Chesterfield, 
who continually contended that the image of the region depended on an excellent public 
transportation system.123 The sentiment of modernization was echoed in numerous opinion 
articles in the months leading up to the election.
Furthermore, the various pro-transit organizations spent in excess of $1.5 million.124 Weakly 
organized Tea Party opposition argued that Metro’s lack of fiscal responsibility should not 
be rewarded, but the group was ultimately outspent “1,000-to-one.”125 Measure A passed 
62.9 percent to 37.1 percent.
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Table 7. St. Louis County “Rebound” Factor Analysis
St. Louis
(November 2008)
St. Louis
(April 2010)
Fail Pass 
Multimodal proposal é é
Highway funding ê ê
Benefits distributed throughout area é é
Sunset provision of 20 years or less é é
Extension of existing rail system é é
Extensive stakeholder participation in development 
of package
ê ê
Lack of problems with existing transit system ê ê
Congressional or presidential election é ê
Congestion “crisis” ê ê
Recent initiative experience ê é
Sponsorship by the business community ê óa
Sponsorship by key elected officials ó ób
Total fundraising (near $1 million?) ê é
Support from environmental groups é é
Consultant with initiative experience é é
Use of media ê é
Unorganized, poorly funded opposition é é
Number of factors replicated 8 11
Number of anomalous factors 8  5
Number of ambiguous conditions 1  2
Notes: 
a Business contributions and support increased between the elections, but a uniform voice of support from the 
business community was not seen.
b While Nations was prominently featured, no research was conducted as to his popularity in the region. Notably, 
Nations headed St. Louis Metro at the time of this writing.
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Santa Clara County
• 2006: Measure A, a ½ cent sales tax increase for general county purposes includ ing 
(technically) unspecified transit projects is rejected 43 percent to 57 percent
• 2008: Measure B, an eight cent sales tax increase dedicated to fulfilling VTA’s 
obligation to BART operations and maintenance (contingent on receipt of matching 
funds) passes 66.8 percent to 33.2 percent
In January of 2006, the experienced pro-transit stalwart Silicon Valley Leadership Group 
(SVLG), an association that features heavy hitters of local high-tech industry, spearheaded 
efforts to configure further public financing of the planned BART extension to San Jose. 
Cash-strapped Santa Clara County (feeling the effects of a number of underperforming 
revenue streams after the burst of the high tech bubble circa 2001) was simultaneously 
contemplating a sales tax increase for underfunded health and housing services. The 
SVLG conducted polling testing ballot language, and found that Santa Clara County voters 
would likely not support “competing” measures requiring two-thirds majorities, but that a 
simple majority required for a general tax increase was attainable.
This information led the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors to place the general tax 
increase on the June 2006 Primary Election ballot. The measure gained modest political 
support, but San Jose City Hall was the target of much negativity following a series of 
scandals revolving around outsourced contracts and subsidies to perceptibly extravagant 
events, leaving Measure A without a trusted champion.
Furthermore, as the measure was a general tax increase, transit proponents were limited 
in their ability to promote specific projects. Fact sheets stating the cost of extending BART 
and widening expressways were distributed in an attempt to reassure the public of priority 
projects, but the County could not legally propose an expenditure breakdown. Combined 
with a history of poor management of VTA services and associated distrust, this lack of 
specificity (or timeline of expected benefits) led citizens to reject Measure A, 43 percent to 
57 percent.
In 2008, SVLG returned to the Board of Supervisors after polling indicated Santa Clara 
County voters would likely support a BART dedicated ⅛ cent sales tax increase. The 
language of Measure B was carefully crafted to include a matching funds trigger mechanism 
to reassure citizens both of what specifically they were receiving and “that they wouldn’t be 
left holding the bag” in the event of future VTA financial shortfalls.126
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Table 8. Santa Clara County “Rebound” Factor Analysis
Santa Clara County
(June 2006)
Santa Clara County
(November 2008)
Fail Pass 
Multimodal proposal éa ê
Highway funding é ê
Benefits distributed throughout area N/Ab ó
Sunset provision of 20 years or less ê ê
Extension of existing rail system é é
Extensive stakeholder participation in development 
of package
é ó
Lack of problems with existing transit system ê ó
Congressional or presidential election ê é
Congestion “crisis” é é
Recent initiative experience óc é
Sponsorship by the business community é é
Sponsorship by key elected officials ó ó
Total fundraising (near $1 million?) é é
Support from environmental groups ê ê
Consultant with initiative experience é é
Use of media é é
Unorganized, poorly funded opposition é é
Number of factors replicated   4 9
Number of anomalous factors 10 4
Number of ambiguous conditions   3 4
Notes: 
a The measure included a component for “transportation improvements” generally defined. However, there was 
widespread understanding that the transportation portion of the tax would finance an extension of BART to Santa 
Clara County and roads projects.
b As routes were not specified and spending proportions to be at the discretion of County Supervisors, it is impossible 
to determine whether benefits of transportation improvements would have been distributed equally.
c Santa Clara County last voted on a transit measure in 2000, but as that campaign was led by the same organization 
and individuals in an area well accustomed to transportation measures, the “past two years” logic may not apply in 
this case.
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Kansas City, MO
• November 2006: disregarded citizen-led $1 billion (or more) initiative for light rail, 
electric shuttles, and gondola system surprisingly passes 53 percent to 47 percent
• October 2007: Due to extensive and harmful financial assumptions, the proposal is 
officially deemed infeasible (after near-immediate post-election recognition of this 
assertion in November 2006)
• November 2008: plan for a 14-mile starter rail system is rejected 45 percent to 55 
percent
The citizens of Kansas City have contemplated light rail for over a decade, voting down 
a plethora of initiatives. November 2006 featured a seventh such ballot item, fostered 
and advanced by a lone enthusiast, which was all but dismissed by the Kansas City 
establishment. Ballot Question 2 did not receive the support of the mayor, business 
leaders, or other typically influential groups key to the success of transit measures. The 
pro-light rail campaign consisted of this enthusiast and his associates utilizing free media 
to advocate their cause. Favorable ballot language, combined with generally pro-rail 
coverage in The Kansas City Star and lack of formal opposition to a seemingly far-fetched 
proposal, contributed to a startling 53 percent vote in favor of Ballot Question 2.
The proposal was a detailed plan for 27 miles of light rail, 60 electric shuttles and a gondola 
system connecting Union Station and Liberty Memorial. The price tag of $1 billion was not 
included in the ballot language, which would have permitted an extension of a ⅜ cent 
sales tax that had previously been used to fund bus services, and was planned for renewal 
and continued application to the bus system on a later ballot. As the redirection of funds 
would have led to a 40 percent cut to bus services, and the liberal financial assumptions 
of the plan relied on extensive state and federal commitments, the City ruled the proposal 
infeasible.127 Recognizing the support for rail transit, new Mayor Mark Funkhouser vowed 
to return to the ballot with a workable light rail initiative.
In April 2008, the people of Kansas City voted to renew the ⅜ cent sales tax to be dedicated 
to bus services. In November of 2008, they voted to defeat a proposed further ⅜ cent sales 
tax increase to fund a 14-mile starter light rail line. The new plan’s financing similarly relied 
on matching state and federal commitments, but saw much broader support from elected 
leaders, championed by Mayor Funkhouser and eliciting the support of African-Americans 
on the City Council.128 Kansas City Star articles from the summer of 2008 illustrate the 
message of regional pride in modern transit stirring in discourse. However, a poorly funded 
pro-rail campaign, relying largely on social media sites and other untested ploys allowed 
substantially funded opposition forces to fill the news vacuum with messages of lingering 
uncertainty as to the financing and true benefit of the scaled-back plan. It was defeated 45 
percent to 55 percent.
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Table 9. Kansas City “Rebound” Factor Analysis
Kansas City
(November 2008)
Kansas City
(November 2006)
Fail Pass 
Multimodal proposal ê é
Highway funding ê ê
Benefits distributed throughout area ê ó
Sunset provision of 20 years or less ê ê
Extension of existing rail system ê ê
Extensive stakeholder participation in development 
of package
ê ê
Lack of problems with existing transit system é é
Congressional or presidential election é é
Congestion “crisis” ê ê
Recent initiative experience ê* ê
Sponsorship by the business community ê ê
Sponsorship by key elected officials é ó
Total fundraising (near $1 million?) ê ê
Support from environmental groups é ê
Consultant with initiative experience ó ê
Use of media ê ê
Unorganized, poorly funded opposition ó é
Number of factors replicated 11  4
Number of anomalous factors 4 11
Number of ambiguous conditions 2  2
Note:  
*See case study for rationale.
Conclusions from “Rebound” Case Studies
In many ways this section is a more detailed exploration of the “recent initiative experience” 
factor as it applies to the voting populace and changing political climates. Once more, the 
number of examples is too minute for firm inference, but three of the four cases presented 
demonstrate other factors may loom in the context of previous failures. The last case, 
while showcasing a loss following a success, likewise affirms likely decision-making criteria 
when voters consider ballot measures with substantial rail transit components.
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These analyses touch upon the individual voter’s desired assurance that a measure will be 
implemented as proposed. This assurance appears to be jeopardized by lack of specificity 
of voter benefit, associated lack of justification of expenditure, lack of trust of establishment 
presenting or sponsoring the measure, and negative messaging in predominant news 
media messaging. These factors are encompassed or at least alluded to earlier under 
broader headings of “benefits distributed throughout area,” “lack of problems with existing 
transit system,” “sponsorship by key elected officials,” “sponsorship by the business 
community,” and “use of media.” Delving to a more individual level of analysis, the lessons 
from these cases point to more specific conditions that may make a measure “feel right” to 
the average voter. Conditions paramount in these cases included:
• Positive news coverage from a region’s major newspapers (such as was the case 
in Kansas City in 2006) seemingly lent to success after a stream of failures, and 
coverage with a negative slant (Sound Transit District 2007 and Santa Clara County 
2006) seemingly contributed to defeat.
 ◦ Negative news messaging typically cast doubt on deliverability of proposal at 
estimated cost and timeframe, or linked proposals to unpopular political figures; 
it also speaks to perceptions about the management of the local transit system
• The presence of “competing measures” may be hurtful (St. Louis 2008) or desirable 
in hindsight (Sound Transit District 2007, Santa Clara County 2006).
 ◦ Non-general election timing equates to shorter ballots, the items of which are 
generally subject to a greater share of news coverage- not always positive
 ◦ General election long ballots run the risk of not focusing enough attention on the 
importance of the transit measure and suffering roll-off effects
• Assured financing and specified benefit may justify voter expenditure, overcoming 
historic distrust in transit providers and recessionary economic circumstances 
(Sound Transit District 2008 and Santa Clara County 2008). Of note, as can be 
seen in both cases, smaller tax increases on the second attempt may also be linked 
to this financial justification.
 ◦ Conversely, plans relying heavily on federal and state matching funds and not 
delineating specific routes (individual voter benefits) may suffer after previous 
passage of more specific proposals (Kansas City 2008). Of note, the second 
proposal represented a ⅜ cent tax increase in the same calendar year as a 
⅜ cent tax renewal, whereas the first vote represented redirection of the ⅜ 
renewal.
• The tangible realization of service cuts can lead to an outpour of support from affected 
groups, overcoming lack of faith in transit provider, and/or lukewarm support from 
elected leaders and the business community (St. Louis).
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Many of these conclusions seem relatively intuitive, and (especially in the case of print 
media effects) are possibly becoming less relevant as voters continue to diversify their 
sources of news intake. Contextual pocketbook considerations, while important, were not 
paramount criteria in a number of “rebound” cases from the deep recessionary period of 
autumn 2008 individual level cost/benefit analysis seemingly trumped. (The non-rebound 
case in Los Angeles supports this notion.)
Lastly, a number of rebound cases point to the importance of respectable coalition building 
and consistent messaging in successfully campaigning for transit measures with substantial 
rail components. These sponsors may represent varying levels of conviction from elected, 
business and environmental interests, but as this section on rebounds has acknowledged, 
further consideration may be due to the effects of coverage by predominant news media 
in all such cases, especially those in rapid succession.
CONCLUSIONS
The primary objective for this study was to replicate the 2001 MTI study on the same 
subject; more specifically, to determine whether certain factors or conditions that had 
been associated with the outcomes of transit tax elections (that involved a substantial rail 
component) continue to be. In large part, all limitations and caveats on the case study 
methodology that have been noted aside, the results presented in this report are certainly 
far more corroborative of than in substantial conflict with the earlier ones.
As noted earlier, five factors that were particularly consistent with the outcomes documented 
in the 2001 study were also found to be consistently associated in these elections: (1) 
extensive stakeholder participation in development of package; (2) congestion “crisis”; (3) 
sponsorship by the business community; (4) sponsorship by key elected officials; and (5) 
total fundraising (near $1 million?), consultant with initiative experience, and use of media 
all met or exceeded 75 percent agreement in both studies. In retrospect, the salience of 
these five factors is hardly surprising. In the chronology of a tax ballot initiative, they range 
from the initial phases of meeting a documented or perceived need, involving a significant 
number of stakeholders in developing the plan, to attracting the support (financial and 
otherwise) of the local business community, and thereby collecting sufficient donations to 
fund the campaign that can be guided by an experienced consulting team. The process 
is often tied together by the leadership of a key political figure or figures. In these data, 
projects that, by plan or fortune, managed to embrace all of these factors were likely 
to succeed, and those that omitted one or more were more likely to fail. But even the 
presence of all of these particular factors was not sufficient to enable passage of the 
Seattle measure.
That stated, the performance of several of the factors identified in the 2001 study – 
individually as well as collectively – seems a little less impressive in the later elections 
chronicled in this study. As noted earlier in this section, the factors as a group in the current 
research were less accurate “predictors” of electoral outcomes than in the earlier study. 
Perhaps more troublesome, the tendency of the factors collectively to be more closely 
associated with winning rather than all campaigns was more pronounced in the current 
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data. Bearing in mind that most proposals succeed anyway, it would be more helpful to 
identify factors whose absence seems to breed failure.
Although prior experience with initiative campaigns (“recent initiative experience”) was 
found to be very weakly associated with success or failure in this study, by looking more 
closely at the experience of several communities that conducted efforts in rapid succession, 
it seems that many transit planning agencies demonstrate impressive learning curves in 
evaluating missteps and curtailing future efforts to the desires of their communities. The 
section on “rebound” efforts denotes areas of voter consideration of transit packages, 
among them financing, specificity and foreseeable benefit of proposed projects, and 
effects of news media.
The message from these results for practitioners, therefore, is somewhat mixed. Certain 
factors (detailed earlier) seem almost necessary – but not sufficient – to assure success, 
but it is difficult to say which will likely doom a failure by its (or their) absence. In this 
regard, however, the importance of high-profile support from both political leadership and 
the business communities may be the most likely candidates. The impact of several other 
factors that seemed stronger in 2001 still seems likely, but is also less reliable in the more 
recent examples. Of course, many other idiosyncratic factors are likely to be at play in any 
future campaign, so practitioners would be wise to use these results with extreme care and 
awareness of the complexity of local political conditions.
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